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ABSTRACT 
The food and agriculture sector in the United States is vulnerable to attack. One solution 
is to ensure that homeland security programs within the state departments of agriculture 
have the necessary support and resources. However, there is little understanding of the 
abilities and capabilities of state departments of agriculture related to homeland security 
initiatives. The challenge is that these programs tend to fall between agriculture and 
homeland security programs. 
This research involved interviewing representatives of 24 state departments of 
agriculture to identify success factors and barriers related to homeland security programs. 
Respondents reported multi-state agriculture groups, public-private partnerships, and 
organizational structure as success factors in building successful homeland security 
programs. This research found that lack of information sharing, a disconnect between the 
federal and state government, and inadequate funding created barriers to the 
implementation of constructive homeland security programs.  
To better position the homeland security programs within state departments of 
agriculture, this research provides several recommendations. Given the diversity of the 
roles and responsibilities in agriculture agencies, it is not possible to develop a model 
program for every state. These recommendations identify components of a model 
program that agencies could selectively use to enhance the effectiveness of homeland 
security programs.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
What makes the vulnerabilities in agriculture so worrying is that the 
capabilities that are required to exploit those vulnerabilities are not 
significant and certainly far less significant than those that would be 
required to carry out a mass attack against humans using biological 
agents. 
Peter Chalk (Agroterrorism: The threat, 2003, p. 15) 
RAND Corporation 
For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not 
attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.  
Tommy G. Thompson (Pear, 2004, ¶ 2) 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 2004 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research provides state departments of agriculture with a better 
understanding related to the development of homeland security programs. Information 
related to agroterrorism indicates that the threats are real and that existing homeland 
security strategies are fragmented, yet limited guidance is available for the development 
of homeland security programs. State departments of agriculture are typically responsible 
for developing prevention programs, protecting agriculture resources, and responding to 
crop or foreign animal diseases incidents; however, the lack of information related to the 
capabilities of agriculture agencies to respond to agroterrorism is problematic.  
The core of agriculture is centered along the “farm to fork” continuum; however, 
a more comprehensive definition includes more than just the farm and grocery store and 
could properly be defined to encompass the related elements of transportation, 
distribution, machinery repair, and other support sectors. Use of the broader definition 
reinforces the idea that agriculture and its related sectors are critical to the social, 
economic, and political stability of the United States. 
In the U.S. Senate hearing entitled Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s 
breadbasket, Senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME) explains that agriculture: 
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…is a sprawling industry that encompasses a half-billion acres of 
croplands, thousands of feedlots, countless processing plants, warehouses, 
research facilities, and factories for ingredients, ready-to-eat foods, and 
packaging, as well as the distribution network that brings food from 
around the Nation and around the world into the neighborhood markets 
and restaurants via virtually every mode of transportation. (2003, p. 1) 
In terms of economic power, agriculture is a major component and accounts for 
about 13% of the U.S. gross domestic product. The market value of all products sold in 
2007 amounted to nearly $300 billion, and approximately 18% of domestic employment 
relates to the agriculture sector (Monke, 2007; United States Department of Agriculture 
[USDA], 2007). The United States is the world’s largest beef producer and a net beef 
importer. The estimated total value of global meat and live animal trade is approximately 
$33 billion (USDA, 2007). In the United States, agriculture accounts for nearly $60 
billion or 8% of all exports. Importation of agricultural products into the United States 
amounts to a total of $47 billion (accounting for 4% of all U.S. imports). Taken together, 
this makes agriculture a positive contributor to the balance of trade in the United States 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005).  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This research explored elements of a homeland security program within state 
departments of agriculture. To assist in the process, this study sought to identify success 
factors and barriers to developing constructive homeland security programs. Currently, an 
understanding of how homeland security programs within agriculture agencies are 
structured and function does not exist. This research will develop recommendations for 
enhancing the capabilities of state departments of agriculture and for improving 
homeland security programs related to agriculture.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the elements of homeland security programs within state departments of 
agriculture?  
3 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
What factors related are to the success of homeland security programs within state 
departments of agriculture structure? 
What barriers are related to homeland security programs within state departments 
of agriculture structure? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research was comprised of two elements: a rigorous review of the literature 
and 24 telephone interviews with homeland security officials in select state departments 
of agriculture. Interviews included a combination of semi-structured questions and 
relevant probing questions to explore the elements of a homeland security program. In an 
effort to maintain consistency, a common questionnaire guided all of the interviews.   
Using a grounded theory approach, relevant themes and concepts emerged from 
the data. Through open coding, common themes and attributes emerged. Open coding 
and data collection activities occurred simultaneously and continued as the core 
categories were examined, categorized, and evaluated from the evidence collected during 
the research (Yin, 1994). As the data were coded, specific theoretical propositions 
surfaced. True to grounded theory, the analysis of the data highlighted specific categories 
and properties of importance.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to examine homeland security programs within 
state departments of agriculture with the goal of determining characteristics of a model 
program. While many of the issues represented in this study have been addressed 
individually, they have neither been adequately viewed as a whole nor have they been 
studied as they relate specifically to state departments of agriculture. The topic is 
significant because it provided insights into the emerging role of state departments of 
agriculture in national security initiatives.  
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I provides an overview of the research project. Chapter II discusses the 
relevant literature on agriculture, agroterrorism, federal policies and guidelines, and 
elements related to model programs. Chapter III outlines the methods used in the study. 
Chapter IV presents the data collected through the interviews. Chapter V provides 
recommendations related to success factors and barriers associated with homeland 
security programs in state departments of agriculture.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The threat of agroterrorism is real. From recent events, we know there 
are forces that are seeking to harm America in any possible manner and 
that our agriculture is particularly vulnerable. We know that those who 
seek to harm us constantly change their tactics. We cannot overlook the 
threats to agriculture and our food supply. 
James Lane1 
Ford County Undersheriff, Dodge City, KS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature in this overall field of inquiry is very diverse but is somewhat 
limited in relationship to structuring homeland security programs within state 
departments of agriculture. A review of literature can place the existing body of 
knowledge in the following sub-categories: 
• United States Agriculture Vulnerabilities – why are we vulnerable? 
• Agroterrorism Targets – what are the threats? 
• Guidelines and Reports Related to Homeland Security and Agriculture – 
what policies and programs are in place? 
• Coordination Initiatives – how can regionalism work in agriculture? 
• Organizational Design – how might a homeland security program be 
structured?  
This chapter provides background and directly relates existing literature to the 
research questions. Information in the initial two sections assesses agriculture 
vulnerabilities and describes potential agroterrorism targets. An analysis of relevant 
guidelines and reports provides supportive background. The final two sections contain 
                                                 
1 To review Biosecurity Preparedness and Efforts to Address Agroterrorism Threats: Hearing before 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005, July 20), p. 33. 
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information related to the coordination initiatives and organizational design elements. 
This research proposes to look at the intersection of these various bodies of information.  
B. UNITED STATES AGRICULTURE VULNERABILITIES 
Agriculture in the United States has undergone radical transformation over the 
last century. Many characteristics of agriculture create unique challenges related to agro-
security. The general susceptibility of the food and agriculture sector to an agroterrorist 
attack is difficult to eliminate in a systematic way due to the concentration of farms, the 
openness of farms, and the lack of veterinarians.    
1. Concentration of Farms 
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the number of farms 
(see Figure 1) in the United States has decreased by over 60% during the last 100 years; 
however, the size of the farms has increased as farming practices have become more 
concentrated. The 2007 Census of Agriculture found “that concentration of production in 
agriculture has increased in the last five years. In 2002, 144,000 farms produced 75 
percent of the value of United States agricultural production. In 2007, the number of 
farms that produced that same share of production declined to 125,000” (USDA, 2007, p. 
4). The changes related to the concentration of farms means that a greater percentage of 
agriculture production is accounted for by the largest farms.  
Labor-intensive farming on smaller farms has given way to use of technology on 
these larger facilities. Because of these larger farms, more and more animals are 
contained in each premise. Dr. Peter Chalk, an analyst with the RAND Corporation and a 
biowarfare expert explains: 
…these herds tend to be in very concentrated populations and are reared 
and bred in close proximity to one another. An outbreak of a contagious 
disease at any one of these facilities, particularly if it was airborne in 
character, would be very difficult to contain and could quite easily 
necessitate the wholesale eradication of all exposed animals, which is both 
technically and financially demanding. (Agroterrorism: The threat to 




Figure 1.   Concentration of Farms in the United States (From: USDA, 2007) 
In addition to the increasing size of farms, a related problem is that livestock and 
poultry production are becoming more concentrated within specific areas of the United 
States. Feedlots can house over 55,000 head of cattle, and each animal can consume 30 
pounds of feed each day. This concentration offers some economies of scale and 
decreases transportation expenses; however, it would also make it easy for a potential 
terrorist to infect a large number of animals within a few premises (Foxell, 2001; GAO, 
2005; Monke, 2007). Foxell states that “over 70% of U.S. beef cattle is currently 
produced within the locus of a 200-mile circle” (2001, p. 110). In a very broad sense, 
each farm is a potential point of introduction into the food chain and therefore a potential 
node for an act of agroterrorism.  
2. Openness of Farms 
Another potential weak link in overall security initiatives for agriculture is the 
openness of farms. Farms and food processing facilities tend to be geographically located 
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in unsecured environments. This concern centers on the lack of security and surveillance  
programs. While some farms have instituted biosecurity programs to reduce the 
probability of disease introduction, it is impossible to eliminate all vectors (Chalk, 2004; 
Cupp, Walker, & Hillison, 2004; GAO, 2005).  
In addition, many of these facilities are hard to camouflage due to size and 
distinct odor. While some critical operations can be located in non-descript buildings, it is 
impossible to hide large poultry houses or cattle feedlots. Agriculture, in general, requires 
large tracts of land, and the sheer size of some farms makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
to restrict access to all areas. Farms have inadequate barriers to keep people out; in most 
cases, fences and gates exist to keep animals contained (Chalk, 2004; Cupp, Walker, & 
Hillison, 2004; GAO, 2005).  
3. Lack of Veterinarians  
There is a shortage of qualified veterinarians to deal with animal disease 
outbreaks and food inspection requirements in the United States. The lack of experience 
of veterinarians with foreign animal diseases is an animal health and food safety concern 
(Cauchon, 2008a; Cauchon, 2008b; Chalk, 2004; Cupp et al., 2004; GAO, 2005). The 
limited number of veterinarians is an issue for the food inspection system because 
veterinarians are typically responsible for much of the meat and poultry processing 
regulatory work. For example, one agency within the USDA reported that 30% of its 
veterinarians could be lost to retirement by 2011. Another USDA agency reported that its 
veterinarian staffing requirement fell short by 15% or 166 veterinarians (GAO, 2009a, 
GAO, 2009b). 
The shortage of large animal veterinarians contributes to the overall problem 
associated with early detection and response (Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s 
breadbasket, 2003). Many veterinarians in the United States lack training related to 
foreign animal diseases. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the 
USDA would need to “obtain the 1,200 additional veterinarians trained in responding to 
foreign animal diseases that it estimates the nation will need to respond to an FMD [foot 
and mouth disease] outbreak” (GAO, 2002b, p. 5). In many cases, veterinarians serve as  
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first-line responders, and a decreased pool of qualified agriculture professionals means 
there is a limited number of personnel who could detect a foreign animal diseases or a 
foodborne disease.  
C. AGROTERRORISM TARGETS 
Terrorism targeting agriculture or food supply is called agroterrorism, which 
simply put is “the deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or 
into the food chain, for purposes of undermining socioeconomic stability and/or 
generating fear” (Chalk, 2004, p. xi). The GAO relies on a more narrow focus by limiting 
the terminology to “the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases at the farm 
level” (GAO, 2005, p. 3) which specifically excludes attacks on food.  
In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Dr. Rocco Casagrande, 
the Managing Director of Gryphon Scientific and a former UN weapons inspector 
explained that unlike other means of terrorism, an attack on agriculture does not require a 
high degree of scientific knowledge. Casagrande stated, “due to the very low technical 
barriers of an attack such as this, there doesn’t need to be any specific scientific expertise 
married with the will” to carry out an attack (Evaluating the threat of agro-terrorism, 
2003, p. 28). This means that an individual wanting to conduct an agroterrorist attack 
would just require some basic understanding of placing a pathogen at the proper place in 
the flow of commodities (Evaluating the threat of agro-terrorism, 2003). 
Luckily, the agriculture and food sector have not been subject to a large-scale 
attack. One relatively small-scale example is the intentional contamination of a salad bar 
in The Dalles, Oregon (1984), in which approximately 750 people became ill. A religious 
commune intentionally spread salmonella on several salad bars in an effort to affect a 
local election. A separate incident involved the reported contamination of thousands of 
crates of Chilean grapes (1989) with cyanide; however, after nearly $300 million in lost 
imports, scientists were only able to locate two grapes with small quantities of cyanide. 




cyanide. Even though no human health consequences resulted from the grape scare, it did 
highlight the potential economic impact of a suspected agroterrorism attack (Davis, 2004; 
Polyak, 2004). 
The majority of agriculture-related health concerns deal with accidental or 
naturally occurring incidents. In an average year, there are five major foodborne pathogen 
outbreaks in the United States. A recent study found that nearly “76 million Americans—
one in four—are sickened by foodborne disease each year. Of these, an estimated 
325,000 are hospitalized and 5,000 die” (Trust for America’s Health, 2009, p. 1). 
Outbreaks of E. coli 0157:H7 provide examples related to the impact of large-scale 
foodborne contamination on the food supply and the economy (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, n.d.). Aside from the direct human health issues, these food 
recalls also have damaged the market share of these companies. 
Depending on the disease selected, agroterrorism could be used either to create 
severe socioeconomic disruption or as a method to cause direct human casualties; 
however, most experts downplay the use in targeting humans. According to the GAO, 
“experts believe that terrorists would choose to attack livestock and crops if their primary 
intent was to cause severe economic dislocation…terrorists would choose to contaminate 
finished food products if harm to humans was their motive” (GAO, 2003, p. 3). This 
versatility presents opportunities for terrorists and creates many challenges for homeland 
security professionals.    
The U.S. economy would likely be the primary target during an agroterrorism 
attack (Wheelis, Casagrande, & Madden, 2002). The costs associated with response and 
recovery coupled with the loss of international trade and new regulatory costs would be 
excessive. When researching the economic impacts related to the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, Lenain, Bonturi and Koen found that “the international trade system is 
dangerously exposed, with potentially large repercussions for supply-chain management. 
Another devastating terrorist attack would exacerbate these trends” (2002, p. 32). The 
repercussions of an agroterrorist attack would likely throw international trade issues off 
balance. Even during the response to natural disease outbreaks, trade is often affected.  
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Economic losses from an agriculture incident would likely be large and 
widespread. Some of the potential impacts include the following: 
• Direct costs related to the value of lost production, the cost of destroying diseased 
or potentially diseased products, and the cost of containment (quarantines, 
vaccines, diagnostics, pesticides, and other related expenses). 
• Lost export markets if countries place bans or restrictions on importing U.S. 
products. This would include expenses related to inspections and other 
requirements associated with international trade. 
A majority of these expenses would be borne by agriculturally dependent 
businesses (such as equipment manufacturing and repair, suppliers, manufacturing, 
transportation, retail grocery, and food service industries). Additional lost revenue could 
affect tourism as potential quarantines restrict movement.  
Governmental agencies would likely bear the costs associated with eradication 
and containment programs and indemnification. The 1997 outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) in Taiwan cost farmers over $4 billion in loss of animals and $10 million 
for vaccine purchases. The costs for surveillance, cleaning and disinfection of affected 
livestock premises, and related viral eradication programs continue to climb. The 
estimated expense associated with trade embargoes was nearly $15 billion. The 2001 
outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom resulted in payments of over 
several billion dollars for the culling operations and nearly a greater amount in the loss of 
tourism (Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket, 2003; Chalk, 2004).  
In some cases it might be difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between an 
agroterrorism event and a natural occurrence. In most cases, the spread of the disease or 
dispersion of insects will typically follow predictable patterns. The concern is that an 
agroterrorism attack might initial appear to involve an isolated disease outbreak. Under 
some circumstances, however, the initial outbreak could be radically different. An 
agroterrorist attack: 
…would likely be carried out on a larger scale, perhaps affecting different 
regions of the country simultaneously. Such a widespread introduction 
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would tax and could overwhelm (at least initially) the resources available 
to control the outbreak. On the other hand, an accidental introduction 
would more likely have a single starting point and may be more easily 
handled by planned emergency response mechanisms and resources 
depending on time to detection. (Kelly, et al, 2004, p. 111) 
An understanding of the threats facing U.S. agriculture interests requires an 
analysis of all aspects of the “farm to fork” continuum. While the broader definition 
would include processing, transportation, and other elements, the key to the agricultural 
sector relates to the following sub-sectors: 
1.  Animals  
2.  Plants  
3.  Food supply  
These three sub-sectors within agriculture form the core of homeland security 
programs within agriculture. In 2005, the GAO reported that it appears “that livestock 
and poultry are more likely to be targets of a terrorist” than attacks direct towards the 
food supply (GAO, 2005, p. 2). Experts suggest that:  
…the likelihood of terrorist acts interrupting the production, processing, 
and distribution of agricultural products is high: A number of different 
possible plant or animal pathogens could cause harm or loss of production, 
and even an act of agroterrorism that did not result in the destruction of 
foodstuffs or interruptions in the food supply could have a psychological 
impact. (Cupp et al., 2004, p. 97) 
1. Animals 
One of the more devastating “attacks” on agriculture would be the introduction of 
a foreign animal disease, such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). The Department of 
Homeland Security held an exercise called Silent Prairie to assess the effect associated 
with the introduction of FMD into the United States. In a summary of the exercise, a 
report from the National Defense University stated, a “response to an agricultural 
bioterrorism attack could require significantly more resources than the attack on the 
World Trade Center” (2002, p. 2). Halweil reports that in relation to the simulated 
introduction of FMD: 
…participants looked on with alarm as the simulated virus raced across 
America. Within a week, only portions of New England, Hawaii, and 
Alaska were unaffected. After 45 days, 20 million imaginary animals had 
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been destroyed. Losses totaled in the tens of billions of dollars, and public 
panic was leading to calls for martial law. (2005, p. 25) 
At the conclusion of the exercise, officials concluded that the American food 
system, even with the implementing prevented measures, was extremely vulnerable.  
Dr. Tom McGinn,2 the former Assistant State Veterinarian and Director of 
Emergency Preparedness for North Carolina Department of Agriculture, testified before 
the Committee on Governmental Affairs in the U.S. Senate that one simulation, involving 
the intentional introduction of FMD into multiple locations, found that 
By Day Five, we [the disease spread] are already in 23 States, and that 
Day Five is the first day that the disease is detected. So it is subclinical. It 
cannot be seen until Day Five and then it is in 23 States. By Day Eight,  
it is in 29 States, and then we would probably be in a position where there 
will be a national stop movement declared. The national stop movement 
would result ultimately in an estimated destruction of over 23 million 
animals. (Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket, 2003,  
p. 10) 
Estimates vary on the direct costs associated with an FMD outbreak, but the GAO 
suggests it will be over $24 billion (GAO, 2002b). However, the total federal 2009 
budget for the USDA to enhance protection and safety of the nation’s agriculture and 
food supply is $2.8 billion (USDA, n.d.). It is likely that during a widespread outbreak, 
costs would continue to rise. Although slightly dated, one report states “President Bush’s 
appropriations of $89 billion for one year of military operations and reconstruction in 
Iraq and Afghanistan roughly equals the costs of uncontrolled FMD in California for a 
period of only 14 weeks” (Polyak, 2004, p. 6). In addition, loss of agricultural trade 
would be between $6 and $10 billion a year until the disease is eradicated (GAO, 2002b).  
Research shows that the speed at which the problem is detected, diagnosed, and 
controlled is the key difference between an isolated incident and an economic and public 
health disaster. The latency period of some animal diseases makes early detection 
improbable, and “the long period between introduction of a pathogen and discovery of 
the resulting disease (from days to years) makes successful eradication or containment of 
                                                 
2 Dr. McGinn is currently the Chief Veterinarian for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of 
Health Affairs. 
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disease very difficult” (Postnikova et al., 2008, p. 1156). Being able to identify and 
isolate a disease quickly will determine the extent of economic damage and potential 
public health impacts. 
Even though there are no strict guidelines related to the selection of an agent for 
attacking animals, there are some generally accepted criteria. These criteria include the 
disease being: highly infectious, contagious, and deadly; hardy so it can survive in the 
environment; easily spread in a predictable pattern (so it can be known to cause the 
desired impact); and easy to produce or acquire. If a terrorist organization did not want to 
alert officials of the attack, they would select an agent that has the potential to seen as a 
natural outbreak. In many cases, a non-zoonotic3 agent might be used to prevent harming 
any of the attackers.  
One concern is how little of the material would be necessary to cause a great deal 
of harm. A would-be terrorist could obtain a small amount of an infectious substance 
from any of the places around the world where the disease is endemic and could easily 
smuggle it into the United States. In most cases, no advanced scientific expertise is 
necessary to transport the material. For example, “all an individual would need to do is 
wipe a handkerchief on the mouth of an infected animal, put that into a zip lock bag, buy 
an airline ticket to the United States, and then drop the infected handkerchief in a feedlot” 
(Rich, 2005, p. 9). This is a challenge because a terrorist could easily introduce a disease 
into a farm or feedlot, and it would be extremely difficult to detect or respond to this 
animal disease incident (Casagrande, 2000; Wheelis et al., 2002). 
2 Plants 
While it is more likely that livestock will be a target than cultivated plants, 
agriculture crops remain vulnerable. The introduction of an agriculture pest4 would have 
                                                 
3 Zoonotics are diseases that are harmful to both humans and animals. Non-zoonotics, therefore, are 
diseases that are only harmful to animals. 
4 Agriculture pests include any insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed or other form of terrestrial or 
aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria or other micro-organism (except viruses, bacteria, or other 
micro-organisms on or in living man or other living animals) that are not native to that environment and 
cause adverse damage to plants. 
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the potential to damage or destroy much of the grains in the United States. However, 
plant pathogens tend to be much more technically difficult to manipulate than animal 
diseases. A terrorist using one of these diseases would need the expertise to overcome the 
biological conditions, such as humidity, temperature, or wind, which would make plant 
pathogens grow and prosper. Even skilled plant pathologists can find it difficult to control 
diseases in the field and typically find the environment uncooperative (Chalk, 2004; 
Cupp et al., 2004; Foxell, 2001; Monke, 2007).  
Hundreds of diseases have the potential to affect agriculture resources, but only a 
few dozen have the ability to cause significant economic impact. One of the challenges is 
that there is no agreed-upon list of plant pathogens or insects that terrorist would likely 
use or even a list of pests (e.g., diseases or insect) which would likely to the most damage 
to American agriculture.  
In testimony before the U.S. Senate, Dr. John Sherwood5 stated:  
…the geographical expanse and economic importance of the U.S. 
agriculture enterprise creates a vulnerability for the intentional or 
unintentional introduction of plant pathogens that could directly affect 
crop yield and the viability of our crop production systems in our fragile 
rural economies. (To Review Biosecurity Preparedness, 2005, p.31) 
The USDA and other experts have identified some pathogens that terrorists could 
use during an agroterrorist attack. In most cases, plant pathogens have no direct impact 
on human health. The likely outcome would be economic and human health threats 
related to altering diets. The distinction is that plant pathogens target the agriculture crops 
and result in the destruction and loss of crops. It also takes a longer period for plant 
diseases to achieve the desired impact as compared to animal diseases (Chalk, 2004; 
Casagrande, 2000; Cupp et al., 2004; Foxell, 2001; Monke, 2007).  
Two threats of concern are wheat stem rust and soybean rust. Wheat stem rust has 
the potential to devastate the world supply of wheat. Estimated losses could be severe (up 
to 70%) over a large geographic area and would result in the destruction of many fields. 
                                                 
5 Dr. John Sherwood is the head of the Department of Plant Pathology at the University of Georgia in 
Athens, Georgia.  
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Some reports indicate that wheat rust has been “weaponized” as an agroterrorism agent. 
Another potential agent is soybean rust which is a pathogen naturally spreading in the 
United States. Soybean rust has the potential to result in crop yield losses up to 80% 
(Cupp et al., 2004; DaSilva, 1999; Foxell, 2001; Schaad, Shaw, Vidaver, Leach, & 
Erlick, 1999). The conversion of these diseases into weapons is a concern for even 
diseases already found in isolated areas within the United States. The weaponization 
could enable the spread into other areas where control efforts or natural predators would 
not be able to limit the impact of the disease introduction.  
Another threat to agriculture is invasive insects. While most of these invasive 
pests cause damage to forest resources, many have the potential to cause severe damage 
to agriculture crops. For example, the boll weevil was able to do extensive damage to the 
U.S. cotton-growing industry in the early 1920s. A combination of federal and state 
initiatives to control the insect enabled the industry to resume production. The 
introduction of non-native insects has a severe potential economic impact because 
eradication and control programs are likely to cost millions of dollars. Another potential 
impact of invasive insects is the alteration of the native environment with resulting 
impact of tourism. 
Human health would not be a consideration when evaluating the risks associated 
with the use of insects to destroy agriculture crops. The insects would directly damage 
the quality and quantity of the crops. In most cases, the only indirect impact on humans 
would relate to altering diets. If it were not possible to eradicate the pests, crops resistant 
to the invasive pest would be necessary to replace the original crop.   
3. Food Supply 
The primary intent of targeting the food supply would be to cause economic 
impact and to kill people (Evaluating the threat, 2005). Spreading foodborne pathogens 
would not necessarily destroy the food; it would just contaminate it. Maintaining the 
supply of food requires addressing both food safety and food defense. Food safety relates 
to protecting the food from accidental contamination. Food defense, on the other hand, 
involves protecting the food from intentional adulteration.  
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Even though thousands of people become sick annually due to foodborne 
pathogens, the food supply of the United States is among the safest in the world. While 
not designated as agroterrorism, the recent concerns related to peanut butter and spinach 
highlight some of the potential weaknesses of current food safety programs. In a 2003 
hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs in the U.S. Senate, Dr. Peter 
Chalk testified that:  
…the farm-to-table food continuum offers a low-tech yet highly 
conducive mechanism for the transport and dissemination of bacteria and 
toxins, such as salmonella, E. coli, and botulism. Developments in the 
farm-to-table food continuum have greatly increased the potential number 
of entry points for these contaminants, which has greatly augmented the 
technical ease of actually carrying out an orchestrated foodborne attack. 
(Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket, 2003, p.16) 
Production of food along the “farm to fork” continuum is a multi-stage process 
involving many different suppliers and producers. Trust for America’s Health explains 
that the “decentralized governmental food safety system means state and local 
governments have jurisdiction for food safety issues in their communities beyond those 
that are directly regulated and monitored by federal agencies” (2008a, p. 11). Currently, 
there is a great deal of interest on the federal level to complete an overhaul of the food 
safety system. An important part of this re-structuring involves enhancing the 
collaboration of state and federal agencies. 
A top concern related to food safety is the lack of uniform surveillance at small-
scale production facilities. Many of these plants have not established adequate biosecurity 
programs and do not have mechanisms in place to track the dissemination of products to 
supermarkets and other distributors. While these facilities are likely the most vulnerable, 
an attack on the small-scale producers would likely have minimal consequences, given 
their smaller market distribution (Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket, 
2003). 
All aspects of agriculture, including animals, plants and the food supply, are 
vulnerable to an attack. These threats are part of all-hazard preparedness models within 
the food and agriculture sector. An attack would likely not result in direct human 
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causalities but would be designed to harm the economy and cause psychological stress. In 
their evaluation of a biological attack on agriculture, Wheelis et al. state that: 
Even a massive outbreak of plant or animal disease in the United States would not 
cause famine; the agricultural sector is too diverse, too productive, and too closely 
regulated for that to be a realistic possibility. However, a successful attack could have 
severe economic consequences. The most substantial impact would be the loss of 
international markets for animal or plant materials. (2002, p. 570) 
If the intent of terrorists were to cause human causalities, there would be more 
effective ways than an attack on agriculture. However, if the primary intent were to cause 
economic harm or to create an atmosphere in which people lost confidence in the 
government, agroterrorism would be a likely means of attack. 
D. GUIDELINES AND REPORTS  
There are numerous directives, policies, and documents related to homeland 
security and agriculture. Information contained in these guidelines and reports enables a 
better understanding of issues related to agroterrorism. In addition, these various 
documents also provide some recommendations for the enhancement of state-based 
homeland security programs.  
1. Executive Branch Initiatives  
Agriculture and food safety programs have not traditionally been a major 
component of terrorism prevention and homeland security programs. Presidential 
Decision Directives (PPD) outline various counterterrorism initiatives released during the 
Clinton administration (see Table 1). Publically released portions of PDD 39 (U.S. policy 
on counter-terrorism) and PDD 62 (combating terrorism) did not even address 
agriculture. Issues related to critical infrastructure planning (PDD 63) did not include 
agriculture or food. However, in more recent federal homeland security guidance 
documents, agricultural issues have been mentioned (Monke, 2007). 
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Select Presidential Decision Directive 
 
Presidential Decision Directive 39 U.S. Policy on Counter-terrorism 1995 
Presidential Decision Directive 62 Combating Terrorism 1998 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 Protecting America’s Critical 
Infrastructures 
1998 
Table 1.   Select Presidential Decision Directives 
A common practice is for U.S. Presidents (used by both George W. Bush and 
Barrack Obama) to use Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) as policy 
guidance documents related to homeland security programs (see Table 2). In terms of 
agriculture, the most relevant are HSPD-7 and HSPD-9. Both HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 also 
provide a more indirect connection to preparation of agroterrorism events. 
 
Select Homeland Security Presidential Directives 
 
HSPD-5 Management of Domestic Incidents 2003 
HSPD-7  Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection 2003 
HSPD-8 National Preparedness 2003 
HSPD-9 Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food 2004 
Table 2.   Select Homeland Security Presidential Directives 
HSPD-7 provides information related to critical infrastructure including 
agriculture (replaced PDD-63) and mandates that federal agencies collaborate with 
private sector partners. This directive gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the 
responsibility for coordinating the overall national effort of protection. It also stipulates 
that federal sector-specific agencies be required to develop policies related to critical 
infrastructure within each sector, including the food and agriculture sector (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], n.d.).  
The current version of HSPD-9 outlines the policies related to the prevention of 
terrorist attacks and major disasters involving food and agriculture (DHS, n.d.). This 
HSPD is the only one specifically designed to address vulnerabilities in the food and 
agriculture sector in the United States. It “instructs agencies to develop awareness and 
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warning systems to monitor plant and animal diseases, food quality, and public health 
through an integrated diagnostic system” (Monke, 2007, p. 22). The implementation of 
HSPD-9 requires federal agencies to rely on capabilities developed within HSPD-8 and 
HSPD-5.  
The guidelines in HSPD-8 provide measures to strengthen the preparedness 
initiatives of the United States related to terrorist attacks and major disasters (DHS, n.d.). 
HSPD-8 describes the how Federal agencies must prepare for a variety of incidents and 
establishes a National Preparedness Goal. In order to achieve the National Preparedness 
Goal it creates the Target Capabilities List to measure preparedness. It also contains 
numerous planning scenarios including a biological attack on the food and agriculture 
sector. One example (Scenario #13) addresses the intentional introduction of a disease 
into the food supply. A second scenario (Scenario #14) relates to the introduction of a 
foreign animal disease. These two scenarios highlight the importance that of agriculture 
in terms of homeland security initiatives (Bea, 2005). 
A more general connection to agriculture is HSPD-5, which describes the 
development of a National Response Plan (now called the National Response Framework 
[NRF]). The NRF offers guidance on the basic principles that all stakeholders use to 
prepare for disasters and emergencies and provides a unified national response to 
incidents on the local level all the way up to the catastrophic national emergencies. The 
NRF creates a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to incident response in the 
United States (Monke, 2007). 
While the National Response Framework provides the general structure related to 
incident management and emergency response, the Emergency Support Function annexes 
contain the details related to the specific roles and responsibilities of governmental 
agencies. These and serve as the primary mechanisms for providing assistance at the 
operational level. The connection to agriculture is through ESF #11, which deals with 
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Monke, 2007). 
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2. Congressional Hearings 
A series of Congressional hearings relate to agroterrorism and biosecurity 
initiatives (see Table 3). From 1999 to 2006, the U.S. Senate held four hearings while the 
U.S. House of Representatives held two meetings. These hearings highlight the of the 
agroterrorism threats facing the United States. Testimony also provides the opportunity to 
identify potential recommendations presented by witnesses representing state 
departments of agriculture.  
 
Select Congressional Hearings on Agroterrorism 
Agriculture biological weapons threat to the United States October 27, 1999 
 Subcommittee on Emerging Threats 
 Committee on Armed Services 
 United States Senate 
 
Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket November 19, 2003 
 Committee on Governmental Affairs  
 United States Senate  
 
Evaluating the threat of agro-terrorism May 25, 2005 
 Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment 
 
 Committee on Homeland Security  
 U.S. House of Representatives 
 
To Review Biosecurity Preparedness and Efforts to Address 
Agroterrorism Threats 
July 20, 2005 
 Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry  
 United States Senate  
  
Bio-Security Coordination January 9, 2006 
 Subcommittee on Research, Nutrition, and General Legislation  
 Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry  
 United States Senate 
  
Agroterrorism’s Perfect Storm: Where the Human Animal Disease Collide June 21, 2006 
 Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack  
 Committee on Homeland Security  
 U.S. House of Representative 
 
Table 3.   Congressional Hearings on Agroterrorism 
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In testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs in the U.S. Senate, 
Dr. Peter Chalk stated, “Agriculture, however, is one area that has received relatively 
little attention in this regard, particularly with respect to accurate threat assessments and 
consequence management procedures. Indeed, the sect was only included as a specific 
component of U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategy following al Qaeda’s attacks on 
September 11” (Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket, 2003, p. 14). These 
hearings highlight the importance of agroterrorism planning and show the seriousness 
with which members of Congress take agroterrorism. 
Congress held one of the initial hearings related to agroterrorism on October 27, 
1999. This Congressional hearing focused on Agriculture biological weapons threat to 
the United States (Agriculture biological, 1999; Monke, 2007). The hearing was 
comprised of both open- and closed-testimony. One witness in the open portion of the 
hearing presented the view of the Department of Defense (DoD) and summarized his 
remarks by explaining that the: 
DoD clearly recognizes the vulnerability of the national infrastructure, and 
American agriculture as one of the pillars on which American economic 
power rests. It represents a lucrative and vulnerable target for terrorists. 
Attacking the nation’s agriculture and food supply system is not a new 
idea. In 1915, the German’s [sic] infected some 3,500 horses purchased in 
the United States by the allies for the World War I war effort. During the 
days of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union had an ambitious bio-
warfare program targeted against American agriculture. The threshold has 
been breached; our vulnerabilities are known. (Agriculture biological, 
1999, Testimony of Robert Newberry, p. 8) 
In November 2003, the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
held a hearing entitled Agroterrorism: The threat to America’s breadbasket. Senator 
Susan M. Collins (R-ME) stated that the hearing’s goal was to “examine the vulnerability 
of America’s agriculture and food industry to terrorist attacks, what our Nation must do 
to defend against agroterrorism, and how prepared we are to respond to such an attack” 
(Agroterrorism: The threat, 2003, p.1). The testimony addressed issues related to animal 
diseases, food security, plant pests and diseases and other aspects of potential 
agroterrorism (Agroterrorism: The threat, 2003). 
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The U.S. House of Representatives conducted its first hearing, Evaluating the 
Threat of Agro-Terrorism on May 25, 2005. Testimony from two witnesses occurred in 
an open-session followed by “a classified threat briefing from experts from the DHS 
Office of Information analysis, the National Counterterrorist Center, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in the area of agricultural terrorism” (Evaluating the threat, 2005, 
p. 1). One of the issues raised was that state departments of agriculture are not receiving 
notification regarding potential threats from DHS (Evaluating the threat, 2005; Monke, 
2007). 
Later in 2005, the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
conducted a hearing entitled To Review Biosecurity Preparedness and Efforts to Address 
Agroterrorism Threats. The intent of the hearing was to “review the efforts by public and 
private entities to increase biosecurity and agroterrorism preparedness” (To Review 
Biosecurity Preparedness, 2005, p. 1). Two panels, consisting of four witnesses each, 
examined issued related to law enforcement, government, and the private sector. The 
witnesses addressed issues related to food safety, animal diseases, and threats against 
agriculture crops (Monke, 2007; To Review Biosecurity Preparedness, 2005).  
In January 2006, a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry met at the Farm Show Complex in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania with 
the goal “to hear about the state of agriculture in the area of biosecurity (Bio-Security 
Coordination, 2006, p. 1). It was comprised of three panels: government officials, 
research institutions, and private industry. The government panel included witnesses on 
both the federal level (USDA and Health and Human Services) and the state level 
(Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture). Research representatives came from colleges 
and universities with public health, veterinary science, and agriculture backgrounds. The 
private industry sector represented by feed, dairy, and grower groups from throughout 
Pennsylvania (Bio-Security Coordination, 2006).  
An additional subcommittee hearing related to agroterrorism took place in 
Athens, Georgia on June 21, 2006, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Homeland Security. This hearing was entitled Agroterrorism’s Perfect Storm: Where 
Human Animal Disease Collide. Representative John Linder (R-GA), Chairman of the 
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subcommittee, noted in his opening remarks that the hearing was intended to “focus on a 
particular agroterrorist threat that could impact both animal and human health, the threat 
of zoonotics agents, diseases that can be transmitted from animal to human, are 
particularly relevant” (Agroterrorism’s Perfect Storm, 2006, p. 1). The two witness 
panels were comprised of both state (Georgia) and federal personnel with backgrounds in 
homeland security and agriculture. 
Both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives have held several 
hearings specifically on agroterrorism and many more on terrorism in general. Testimony 
given at these hearings has focused on aspects of food safety, plant and animal diseases, 
and other threats related to agroterrorism. As a result, Congress has enacted laws and 
appropriations with agroterrorism-related provisions. These hearings are critical in the 
framing of agriculture issues within homeland security. The information gathered through 
these hearings provides both success factors and barriers to implementation of programs 
within state departments of agriculture.  
3. GAO Reports 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly the General 
Accounting Office, periodically provides reports to Congress on relevant homeland 
security initiatives and emergency planning programs. Shortly after the September 11, 
2001, attacks, the GAO released a report entitled Combating Terrorism: Select 
Challenges and Related Recommendations. This report is more relevant for the fact that it 
did not recognize agriculture as being critical in terrorism issues. Comments submitted by 
the USDA noted, “The report speaks almost solely to an act committed with the purpose 
of disrupting any one of a number of infrastructures in the country, with the exception of 
agriculture” (GAO, 2001, p. 168). The focus of USDA comments stressed the point that 
agriculture needs to be involved in a coordinated U.S. terrorism strategy.  
While numerous GAO reports include agriculture, there are several which directly 
pertain to terrorism related to agriculture and the food supply. One example is, Foot and 
Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve 
Outstanding Issues. This GAO report primarily dealt with measures for preventing the 
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introduction of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States and for assessing the ability 
of the United States to respond quickly and effectively to an outbreak FAD. The GAO 
found that: 
The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products 
entering the United States creates an enormous inspection challenge for 
USDA and other federal agencies. According to USDA, it would take only 
one contaminated product coming into contact with one susceptible U.S. 
animal to start a nationwide outbreak. (2002b, p. 8) 
The result is that it is likely impossible to completely prevent the entry of foot-
and-mouth disease into the United States (GAO, 2002b; GAO, 2003). 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred nearly 2,000 inspection 
specialists from the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the 
DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program. In an effort to evaluate the 
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Program, the GAO reviewed programmatic issues 
after the move to the DHS. The GAO indicated that although the move enabled the 
agriculture specialists to obtain access to previously unavailable DHS resources, the 
program still faced a staff shortage problem. As a result, the number of inspections 
performed has declined since the realignment within DHS. The GAO noted that some 
coordination and management difficulties continue to limit the success of the agriculture 
inspections in preventing the introduction of foreign pests and diseases (GAO, 2005; 
GAO, 2006; GAO, 2007a).  
The GAO conducted a comprehensive review of agroterrorism in a report entitled, 
Homeland Security: Much is being done to protect agriculture from a terrorist attack, but 
important challenges remain (2005). This analysis found “the United States still faces 
complex challenges that limit the nation’s ability to respond effectively to an attack 
against livestock” (2005, p. intro). The threats facing agriculture are at all points along 
the “farm-to-fork” continuum. 
There are other GAO reports tangentially related to agroterrorism and food safety 
concerns. One example deals with BSE (mad cow disease) and the ban on feeding cattle 
the neurological material of other cows (GAO, 2002a). The GAO also reported that there 
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is an “insufficient veterinarian capacity” (GAO, 2009a, p. intro) to ensure public and 
animal health. In a related report, the GAO noted “there is a growing shortage of 
veterinarians nationwide—particularly those veterinarians who care for animals raised for 
food, serve in rural communities, and are trained in public health” (GAO, 2009b, p. 1). 
Together, these reports both highlight the threats facing agriculture and identify many of 
the challenges facing the food and agriculture sector. 
4. Laws and Regulations  
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks there has been a major restructuring of 
emergency response programs in the United States. A cornerstone piece of this overhaul 
was the creation of the DHS through the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
The result has been the consolidation of many federal emergency response and planning 
capabilities within DHS. Part of this restructuring brought the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) under the jurisdiction of DHS. The primary connection to 
agriculture was the transfer of many of the port inspectors from the USDA to DHS. 
Following Hurricane Katrina, one critical concern emerged that related to the care 
of pets during emergencies. The result was the passage of the Pet Emergency 
Transportation Standard Act (PETS Act) to provide guidance on the development of 
programs to protect household and service animals. In many states, this required the state 
department of agriculture to coordinate the development and implementation of plans to 
comply with the PETS Act.  
Another piece of legislation that indirectly relates to agriculture is the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). The law amends the Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
of 1992 and provides the U.S. Department of Justice additional options for dealing with 
emerging trends in the animal rights terrorism movement. The AETA enhances the 
definition of animal enterprise to include academic and commercial activities that use or 
sell animals or animal products. Many groups have voiced opposition to AETA by 
claiming that it violates First Amendment rights of people to picket animal research 
facilities. Supporters of AETA counter that it does permit peaceable protesting and the 
 27
focus of the legislation is to protect people and facilities from violence associated with 
radical eco-terrorist organizations (Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 2006).  
E. COORDINATION INITIATIVES  
One limitation with traditional emergency planning is that it has been a classical 
“stovepipe” approach. Within this model, there would be no collaboration; all of Law 
Enforcement, Fire, Emergency Management Agency, or Public Health would operate in 
isolation and resemble a stovepipe. Creating stand-alone plans designed for a specific 
hazard does not recognize or take into account the multi-disciplinary nature of emergency 
response and preparedness. Advocates argue that emergency planning must account for 
the differences among types of hazards and their specific response needs. For example, 
many of the advocates explain that an "all-hazards" approach would be too broad and not 
suitable to address the nuances between responding to a foreign animal disease outbreak 
and a hazardous materials incident.  
1. Regionalism 
Guidance from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security makes expansion of 
regional collaboration part of a National Priority (DHS, 2005). The benchmarks for 
achieving that priority include the development of formalized mutual aid agreements, 
conducting exercises (related to implementing the mutual aid agreements), and 
coordinating planning activities (Caudle, 2006; DHS, 2005). It is within this regional 
approach that DHS acknowledges that threats occur geographically and not based upon a 
specific jurisdiction. 
Caudle (2006) identified the creation of a formal organization and development of 
shared goals as being two critical elements in the formation of regional partnership. 
Caruson and MacManus found that “the ability to coordinate preparedness and response 
activities across multiple jurisdictions is critical to the homeland security mission” (2007, 
p. 3). Formation of these regional partnerships provides the foundation for collaborative 
initiatives across multiple disciplines over a large geographical area. 
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Research within Florida found that “given the complexity of the homeland 
security mission and the unpredictability of terrorist activities, the regional approach 
offers a way to harness resources spread across jurisdictions” (Caruson, MacManus, 
Kohen, & Watson, 2005, p. 168). It is not clear, based upon their research of a regional 
approach within a specific state, if the regional approach across multiple states would 
achieve similar results. Another consideration relates to the success of programs that 
address a specific homeland security mission (i.e., groups designed to address only 
agriculture issues).  
The GAO reports, “regional coordination efforts are enhanced by the presence of 
a collaborative regional organization that includes representation from many different 
jurisdictions and different disciplines” (2004, p. intro). Research is showing the 
importance of developing a regional approach to homeland security programs (Caruson 
& MacManus, 2007; Caudle, 2006). Other organizations, including FEMA, the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, and the National League of Cities call for strengthening 
regionalism related to emergency and disaster management (Dodge, 2002). 
Many intangible benefits are associated with regional coordination. Specifically, 
Carr, Selin, and Schuett (1998) point out using a collaborative approach in planning 
results in intangible outcomes such as building relationships and networks, sharing 
information, improved communication, and gaining trust for each other. Wondolleck and 
Yaffe (2000) state: 
Collaboration can lead to better decisions that are more likely to be 
implemented and, at the same time, better prepare agencies and 
communities for future challenges. Building bridges between agencies, 
organizations, and individuals in environmental management is not an end 
in itself. Rather it is a means to several ends: building understanding, 
building support, and building capacity. (p. 23) 
Overall, the goal of collaborative initiatives is to gain support from all stakeholders and 
to integrate local knowledge (Glicken, 1999; Schuett, Selin, & Carr, 2001). 
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2.  Agriculture Initiatives  
National, state, and local boundaries do not confine the threats facing agriculture 
and do not serve as adequate safeguards against agroterrorism. In order to combat these 
threats, many states are forming multi-state initiatives related to agriculture. While some 
of these partnerships have primarily included representatives from agriculture, some have 
had a more inclusive membership and have reached out to the emergency preparedness 
communities. Throughout the United States there are several regional organizations 
focusing on agriculture emergency response initiatives.  
One of the groups is the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, 
which includes representatives from State Departments of Agriculture, State 
Veterinarian's Offices, Homeland Security, Animal Health Departments, and Emergency 
Management Divisions from twelve states (see Figure 2). The Partnership encourages 
collaboration between stakeholders to enhance agriculture emergency preparedness and 
response initiatives (Gordon, 2004). The Multi-State Partnership for Security in 
Agriculture was one of the first groups established with the sole function of enhancing 




Figure 2.   Multi-state Partnership for Security in Agriculture 
The Southern Agriculture & Animal Disaster Response Alliance (SAADRA) is an 
organization designed to enhance all-hazard capabilities within states at “risk from 
similar natural, intentional, technological, and disease disasters affecting agriculture and 
animals” (SAADRA, slide 2). One of the common bonds of SAADRA relates to the 
shared threats of hurricanes on agricultural interests in the member states (see Figure 3). 
While the primary focus of this organization is on agriculture and animal-related 
emergencies, the overall organizational objectives include issues related to incident 
command and all-hazard response initiatives. 
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Figure 3.   Southern Agriculture & Animal Disaster Response Alliance 
Another group is the Mid-Atlantic Agriculture and Animal Emergency 
Management Alliance (MAAEMA). This group is the most recent agricultural group 
formed and has been struggling to obtain adequate financial support from member states. 
An additional challenge is that unlike other groups, there is not the same common shared 
threat facing the member states (see Figure 4). This group is working on a variety of 
programs related to training and equipment. One the projects undertaken by this group is 
the development of a standard method to identify response equipment.  
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Figure 4.   Mid-Atlantic Agriculture and Animal Emergency Management Alliance 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND MODEL PROGRAMS 
Potential models exist which could offer suggestions on how to structure a 
homeland security program. Recommendations from the United States Commission on 
National Security/21st Century (2001), Jay Galbraith's Star Model, and relevant success 
factors provide frameworks around which programs evaluations can take place.  
1. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 
The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (2001) 
identified specific critical functions within homeland security programs. Two main 
differences exist between this current research and the findings of the United States 
Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission). First, 
the Hart-Rudman Commission focused on national programs while the current research 
addresses state programs. The other difference is that the Hart-Rudman Commission 
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evaluated efforts based on a broader definition of homeland security while this current 
research is investigating homeland security initiatives related more specifically to 
agriculture. Nevertheless, many of the suggestions identified in the Hart-Rudman Report 
are applicable.  
In a study entitled, “A model for effective organization and communication of 
homeland security activities at the state level,” Smith adapted the recommendations from 
the Hart-Rudman Commission to state-level agencies (2007). He suggests that when a 
program aligns with the certain critical functions it becomes “a model agency for 
addressing homeland security-related functions at the state level” (2007, p. 32). His 
(Smith, 2007) more narrowly focused recommendations include: 
a. Developing a comprehensive strategy to heighten ability to prevent and 
protect against all forms of attacks; 
b. Creating an organizational structure with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating and integrating various activities involved in homeland 
security; 
c. Assigning responsibility for coordinating and overseeing activities related 
to homeland security; 
d. Consolidating homeland security activities to improve their 
effectiveness and coherence;  
e. Developing a funding mechanism for coordinating the homeland security 
related overall mission; and 
f. Ensuring that organizational structures enable information flow among all 
stakeholders. 
2. Galbraith's Star Model 
Another approach for investigating organizational design is Galbraith's Star 
Model (see Figure 5). The Star Model provides a framework for clarifying the 
interrelationships of the different components of the organizational structure.  
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Figure 5.   Galbraith’s Star Model (From: Galbraith, 2009) 
Galbraith's Star Model provides a guide for organizational decision making and 
shaping employee behavior. According to this model, factors related to organization 
design fit into five broad categories: 
The first is strategy, which determines direction. The second is structure, 
which determines the location of decision-making power. Processes have 
to do with the flow of information; they are the means of responding to 
information technologies. Rewards provide motivation and incentives for 
desired behavior. And finally, the selection and development of the right 
people—in alignment with the other policies—allow the organization to 
operate at maximum efficiency. (Galbraith, 2009, p. 1) 
The Star Model is a process in which all of the organizational design components 
affect each other. According to Star Model, “for an organization to be effective, all the 
policies must be aligned and interacting harmoniously with one another” (Galbraith, 
2009, p. 5). It is also important to remember that when one element is changed, it will 
affect the other components. According to Galbraith, the structure, processes, and people 
all play a critical role in the effectiveness of an organization to reach its objectives. 
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Specifically, “the organization is not an end in itself; it is simply a vehicle for 
accomplishing the strategic tasks [of the organization]” (Kates & Galbraith, 2007, p. 1). 
The Star Model relies on the interweaving nature of different components (which in turn 
gives it the star shape). 
The research of Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2006) identified specific success 
factors and barriers to collaboration. As part of their research, they took their success 
factors along with each barrier to collaboration and placed them into Galbraith's Star 
Model of organizational design (see Table 4). The use of this approach utilizing both 
success factors and barriers enables the evaluation of other collaborative initiatives.  
Table 4.   Success Factors and Barriers to Collaboration  
a. Strategy 
The strategy component of the Star Model relates to the goals and 
objectives connected with the organization. Specifically, the strategy identifies the 
direction in which the organization is going to move and the programs it is going to 
Factors Affecting Inter-Organizational Collaboration 
(Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen, 2006) 
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Leadership support and 
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Competition for resources 






Lack of competency  
 36
support. In terms of homeland security programs, a strategy might be to develop the goal 
of an all-hazard response capability. Barriers or obstacles to strategy include lack of 
clarity in mission or divergent goals (Galbraith, 2009; Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen, 
2006). 
b. Structure 
Another element of the Star Model relates to the organizational structure. 
Galbraith identifies four factors that determine structure: specialization, shape, 
distribution of power, and departmentalization. Aspects related to the structure of 
homeland security programs within a state department of agriculture relate to each of 
those structure policy areas.  
The location of the program within the department plays a critical role in 
the overall influence of the program. Placing the program within a specific discipline 
(specializations) will likely limit the focus of the organization. For example, some 
departments have their homeland security programs located in an animal health 
administrative unit. Placement within a narrowly focused division might limit their 
connection to all of the relevant homeland security missions within their organization.   
Issues related to span of control (shape) are also considerations that are 
relevant to the effectiveness of homeland security programs. The ability of the homeland 
security program to exercise control over programs (distribution of power) is critical for 
achieving initiatives that require broad support and participation. For instance, the 
completion of a continuity of operations plan might be under the direction of the 
homeland security program, but it will require the participation of all elements of the 
department. The final element related to organizational structure deals with consolidating 
functions and workflow processes (departmentalization). One potential connection to 
this aspect is that program specialists working homeland security functions might have 
other primary job duties that could diminish effectiveness related to homeland security.  
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c. Lateral Mechanisms 
The Star Model identifies the third element as processes (Kates & 
Galbraith, 2007). However, Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2006) refer to this 
organizational design component as lateral mechanism. According to the model, the flow 
of information and the establishment of interpersonal networks rely on the creation of 
these lateral mechanisms. The connection between lateral mechanisms and the model 
program relate to the coordination of the model program and other homeland security 
initiatives in the state.  
d. Incentives 
Rewards or incentives refer to the motivation techniques used to get staff 
members to support organizational goals and objectives. These incentives are the driving 
force for completing many of the activities that support the strategic direction of the 
organization. Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2006) suggest that by classifying 
collaboration as a prerequisite for funding there would be an incentive to use 
collaboration. In homeland security, compliance with the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) is a prerequisite for DHS funding. In essence, this means that the 
receiving DHS funding would be an incentive for agencies to follow NIMS guidelines.  
e. People  
Issues related to people deal with skills and abilities to manage homeland 
security programs. Members need to have the necessary commitment and motivation to 
support the organizational mission, yet organizational design must remain flexible 
enough to support cross-functional teams.  
There appears to be a nexus between the model program advocated by the 
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (2001) and Galbraith's Star 
Model. Connecting the two models permits the identification of key organizational design 





Table 5.   Organizational Design Components 
3. Linking Organizational Design and Success Factors 
It is possible to link organizational design components and success factors to 
create a model program (see Figure 6). The five elements of the Star Model interweave to 
control and shape the behavior of the organization (see point A). In turn, this behavior 
affects performance and culture. All of these elements directly influence implementation 
of success factors and the presence of barriers. These activities have the potential to 
influence the organization and then shape performance and culture (see point B). In 
essence, the organizational factors (Star Model) produce the opportunities in which the 
implementation of success factors is possible. The feedback loop (see point C) will 
contain the elements of a model program. 
Organizational Design Components 
U. S. Commission on National 
Security/21st Century (2001) 
 
 Galbraith's Star Model 
(Galbraith, 2009) 
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Figure 6.   Modified Galbraith Star and Success Factors (From: Galbraith, 2009) 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The research, reports, and programs outlined in this chapter highlight the 
importance of agriculture in the United States and identify the potential threats associated 
with agroterrorism. The defense of our food supply—from “farm to fork”—is a daunting 
task. Nonetheless, many state departments of agriculture are responsible for safeguarding 
animal, plant, and food safety. Even in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 




often a low priority at the state level. The information outlined in the first sections of this 
chapter describes the importance of agriculture in the United States and identifies the 
potential threats related to agroterrorism.  
A challenge facing state departments of agriculture is that there is little guidance 
provided that relates to the development and implementation of homeland security 
programs. The various guidelines and reports examine policies and programs designed to 
support homeland security initiatives. The importance of collaboration is examined in 
relationship to various multi-state agriculture groups. Information related to success 
factors and organizational design offer opportunities for state departments of agriculture 
related to homeland security programs. Together this information creates the framework 
in which state departments of homeland security operate homeland security programs. 




A. INTRODUCTION  
This research was comprised of two elements: a rigorous review of the literature 
and interviews with homeland security officials in select state departments of agriculture. 
The research explored the elements of a homeland security program within state 
departments of agriculture. 
B. POPULATION 
The population studied in this research was all the state departments of agriculture 
in the United States. This research selected the states with a minimum of 1% of the total 
agricultural production of the United States. Using the threshold of 1% of total 
agriculture receipts resulted in the sampling of 32 state departments of agriculture (see 
Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7.   Top Agriculture Producing States 
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It was not the intent to have a geographic balance to the selection of the states. 
The state’s contribution to overall agriculture production in the United States was the 
determining factor in the selection of potential interviewees (see Appendix A: Total 
Agriculture Receipts).  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This research used an interview approach using a combination of semi-structured 
questions and relevant probing questions. The interview process remained consistent 
throughout the research. A common questionnaire guided the interviews, and the 
researcher recorded the answers on pre-printed answer sheets. The interviews began with 
a statement ensuring confidentiality.  
The standardized questions enabled the researcher to obtain specific information 
targeted at the research questions. To collect relevant information, the research grouped 
the open-ended questions in broad categories: organizational structure, collaboration, 
success factors, and programmatic needs. The use of probing questions enabled the 
researcher to draw out additional information from the respondents.  
D. PROCEDURES 
A key element of the methodology was the use of standard procedures when 
conducting the interviews associated with this research. While it was intended for all the 
interviews to adhere to the same format, insights gained from early interviews influenced 
the development of additional probing questions and spurred additional dialogue during 
subsequent interviews. 
1. Pre-testing Interviews Protocol 
Two selected homeland security practitioners were given a draft of the interview 
protocol. Feedback from these reviewers was used to clarify confusing questions and to 
add and remove questions as necessary. In addition, practicing the interview process 
provided an opportunity to refine the official interview process and evaluate the flow of 
the questions in an actual interview setting.  
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2. Participants 
Names of agency6 heads each of 32 state departments of agriculture selected for 
this research were located through the National Association of State Departments of 
Agriculture (NASDA). Each of the agency heads received a letter via postal mail 
describing the research goals and process (see Appendix B: Research Cover Letter), 
briefly describing the research goals and the research process was sent to each agency.  
3. Anonymity of Subjects 
It was predetermined that the names of the participants would not be reported as 
part of the research findings. All of the information with the potential to identify a 
respondent was stored on a password-protected computer in an encrypted database. The 
informed consent process explained this guarantee of anonymity. Names of the states 
participating would be included in the data analysis; however, the use of specific 
comments in data analysis followed a non-attribution policy.  
4. Interview Documentation  
Maintaining detailed and accurate interview documentation was critical to the 
research process. According to established research protocols, the interviewer did not 
record the telephone interviews but did take detailed notes. Following each interview, the 
researcher recorded additional comments and follow-up notes into a computerized file for 
each interviewee. These notes were stored in an encrypted file.  
The notes of each interview was compiled into a memo to assist in the 
conceptualizing the interview data. These theoretical memos included all notes related to 
the interviews and were used to draw a consistent comparison as part of the grounded 
theory approach. Memos served as important tools for refining and keeping track of ideas 
as concepts evolve. The intent was that this process of writing served as an instrument for 
documenting ideas, which become more realistic as concepts emerge. As the data 
collection and coding proceeded, the theories and the memos accumulate. 
                                                 
6 This term includes Secretaries, Directors, and Commissioners.  
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In order to follow a consistent process, an interview guide ensured that all 
relevant topics were covered; this served as a framework (see Appendix C: Research 
Guide) and not as a rigid procedure (Miller, 1992). This guide addressed the objectives of 
the interview with the specific research questions and served as a road map for the 
interview but permitted diversions necessary to address a specific subject of discussion. 
In order to keep the interview on track, this guide helped to pace the interview process 
and to maintain an appropriate time schedule. 
E. DATA ANALYSIS 
A grounded theory approach allowed relevant themes and concepts to emerge 
from the data. The data analysis process consisted of examining, categorizing, and 
evaluating the evidence collected during the research (Yin, 1994). A system of open 
coding enabled the researcher to determine common attributes. Open coding and data 
collection steps were integrated activities, occurred simultaneously, and continued until 
the core categories completely emerged.   
This research relied on multiple approaches for conducting the content analysis. 
Initially, the focus of data coding was on broad categories, but the data collection became 
more focused as themes emerged throughout the process. The collection of information 
was broken down into sub-headings and then into new, separate subject matter fields. 
This process continued throughout this research as the interviews brought to light new 
information. 
The assumption was that the words mentioned most often were the words that 
reflect the greatest concerns. This technique was particularly rich and meaningful due to 
its reliance on coding and categorizing of the data. As the data was coded, specific 
theoretical propositions began to surface. The information identified during the open 
coding revealed links between categories. An element central to this grounded theory 
approach was that categories and properties emerging as links were identified in the 
formation of a theory. 
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F. LIMITATIONS OF METHODS 
One of the potential limitations of this research was associated with the response 
rate. To overcome the potential for limited response, the research made contact with the 
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture to obtain their support. A 
representative of NASDA indicated that an e-mail supporting this research went to the 
states identified in this research. It is not clear whether any of the individuals interviewed 
had received the e-mail of support from NASDA. 
Some consider personal interviews as too subjective; on the positive side, a higher 
degree of personal connection and rapport is possible in this one-on-one type of 
communication. An additional limitation is associated with the reliance on written notes, 
since no recordings were made of the interviews. Another drawback could involve 
misinterpretation of terminology during the coding. Frequently, the benefits of using this 
approach outweigh the limitation by highlighting the rich data associated with personal 
interviews.  
The reliance of a single individual in the coding process in another limitation 
associated with this research. Specifically, the identification of themes relied on a single 
coder to categorize the data; however, reliability was increased by triangulation. The 
findings of this research could have been advanced if a more detailed survey were used to 
explore issues more in-depth.  
Another limitation had to deal with the time of some of the interviews. 
Conducting interviews shortly after the DHS held a Webinar (on agriculture critical 
infrastructure tools) might have highlighted frustration felt towards these programs. 
Many of the respondents cited this program as a prime example of the disconnect 
between the federal government and states. However, many of the respondents expressed 
similar comments in interviews conducted prior to the training.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The success of state departments of agriculture in the development of 
homeland security programs is due to state initiative and not federal 
leadership.  
Anonymous Interview Participant 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The methodology chapter provides specifics of the data collection process. This 
chapter provides an in-depth analysis along the five elements of Galbraith’s Star Model; 
specific examples under each of the elements highlight the relevance to homeland 
security programs. This chapter also includes a section describing the obstacles that state 
departments of agriculture face in the development and implementation of homeland 
security programs.  
The population studied in this research was the top 32 agricultural production 
states in the United States. This chapter presents the findings of the 24 interviews with 
representatives of state departments of agriculture, giving a 75% response rate. Three 
states were unable to participate, and five states did not respond to the mailing or e-mails 
soliciting their participation (see Figure 8).  
 48
 
Figure 8.   States Interviewed for Research 
B. IDENTIFIED SUCCESS FACTORS 
Success factors relate to programs or approaches that support homeland security 
programs within the state departments of agriculture. The respondents were asked a series 
of questions which were designed to address the elements of Galbraith’s Star Model. 
Relevant programs and initiatives that support the elements of the Star Model were 
determined to be success factors.  
1. Strategy 
According to Galbraith’s Star Model, one aspect of organizational design that 
contributes to success factors is strategy. The strategy component relates to the goals and 
objectives connected with the organization. These strategy elements tend to set the 
direction of the program and act much like a strategic plan.  
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a. All Hazard Perspective 
While all agencies included in this research reported focusing on all 
hazards, some agencies place more emphasis on certain elements of the food and 
agriculture sector than on other aspects of agriculture. These states often assign the 
highest priority on those sectors having the greatest economic importance to the state, 
which means the priorities vary from state to state. The majority of states also reported 
the inclusion of agriculture response plans into state-level emergency operations plans. In 
most cases, they reported integrating agricultural plans into the state emergency 
operations plans as functional annexes and not as stand-alone plans.  
Several respondents indicated that a primary focus related to animal health 
issues since that discipline was heavily involved from the earliest days of agriculture 
response plans. The research also suggests that the majority of emergency response plans 
focus specifically on supporting reactions during animal disease outbreaks. This focus 
might be due to high profile incidents in the United Kingdom involving foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) and Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 
mad-cow disease. The response efforts in the United Kingdom to FMD and BSE likely 
served as the impetus for the development of animal disease emergency plans in the 
United States. There have not been similar incidents related to plants, which might 
explain some of the lack of preparation.  
In addition, most states also reported involvement in the development of 
pet care and sheltering programs. A majority of the states noted that developing programs 
in compliance with the PETS Act were not under their agency authority; however, many 
of these agencies did report work being done in the area. Part of the jurisdictional 
challenge is that in some states, animal-related issues are under the authority of other 
agencies, while in other states, pet laws and regulations are local issues.  
On many levels, the issue surrounding pets was tied back to the federal-
state disconnect. While most states understood and supported the goal of the PETS Act, 
the fact that the agencies tasked with program implementation lacked authority, re-
enforced the notion that the federal government did not understand local realities. One 
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state reported that they would only take care of pets “if people were going to eat them” 
(Interview 10-0001, February 22, 2010). Another state developed a detailed legal position 
paper on pet sheltering and specifically connected it as a means to take care of people. A 
common feeling was that this was another one of those unfunded mandates.   
The research identified other major programmatic areas within the 
departments of agriculture that states are slowly addressing. All of the interviewees 
mentioned food safety and security; however, it was apparent that some agencies placed a 
greater emphasis on these initiatives. The findings also suggest that, in general, divisions 
such as plant industries are slower to embrace homeland security initiatives than animal 
health or food divisions. One participant explained that food and water are the foundation 
for homeland security. “Can’t eat, there is a problem. The most important aspect is to 
ensure that we get food and water. If we don’t, everything else is secondary” (Interview 
10-0005, February 19, 2010). 
b. State Homeland Security Strategic Plan 
State homeland security strategic plans normally serve as the state-level 
guidance related to homeland security. Typically, these plans serve as the foundation for 
identifying goals and objectives within statewide homeland security initiatives. In most 
cases, reference to these homeland security goals and objectives is required to obtain 
grant funding. Accordingly, to receive funds, a grant applicant must first link the proposal 
to an element of the strategic plan. Many of the respondents acknowledge that 
requirements set out by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security make it difficult to 
complete all programs. One acknowledged that “It is a struggle to keep up, much less 
move ahead” (Interview 10-0010, February 26, 2010). 
While no questions were directly related to the state homeland security 
strategic plan, several of the states indicated that information on agriculture issues was 
included in their state’s strategic plan. However, many respondents reported that the 
information pertaining to agriculture initiatives in the strategic plan was insufficient. One 
respondent acknowledged concern about the lack of information related to critical 
infrastructure being shared from homeland security agencies. Specifically, the concern 
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was that not have enough information has been provided to complete critical 
infrastructure planning projects. A key to this problem related to the need to get industry 
more involved. The respondent stated “There are many challenges” (Interview 10-0006, 
February 22, 2010). 
A common complaint was that homeland security agencies in states 
typically group agriculture issues into other critical infrastructure protection programs. 
The concern is that classifying agriculture with other parts of the critical infrastructure 
does not reflect the complexity of agriculture. This also has the tendency to limit the 
funding of agriculture-related programs. The lack of knowledge of ESF usage suggests 
limited coordination between state emergency management officials and representatives 
of the state departments of agriculture. 
c. Emergency Support Functions 
Another common discussion point revolved around the adoption of the 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The adoption of ESF is relevant to structure 
because it has the tendency to determine the direction of the program and the initiatives 
that are supported. The majority of the respondents indicated that their state was utilizing 
the ESF approach, and the primary focus was on ESF-11, which deals with food and 
agriculture. A breakdown of utilization (see Table 6) suggests that the majority of states 
currently use the ESF approach, but five states were unable to report on the use of ESF 
within their state.  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Utilization of ESF Structure   (N=24) n  % 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Utilize ESF Structure     14  58.33% 
Does not Utilize ESF Structure    2  8.33% 
Moving towards ESF Structure    2  8% 
Utilization of ESF Unknown    6  25.33% 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.   Utilization of ESF  
A few states reported being the lead agency on other ESFs, which align 
with other non-agriculture missions of their agencies. This was not a surprise given the 
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role that state departments of agriculture play across the country. For example, states also 
reported playing a lead role in ESF-6 (Mass Care) and ESF-12 (Energy). The connection 
to ESF-6, in general, was related to pet sheltering during emergencies. Even though many 
state departments of agriculture have jurisdiction over fuel, only one reported a 
connection to ESF-12. A majority of the respondents with a familiarity of ESF reported 
the importance of lead and support agencies in accomplishing response missions.  
2.  Structure  
The respondents were asked to answer a variety of questioned design to assess the 
structure of the homeland security program. Structural questions focused on how the 
program specifically operates and were related to the location of the program within the 
organization and what internal operations configurations are in place.   
a. Placement Within Organization  
The location of the homeland security program was determined by having 
the respondents describe the structure of their program. An initial focus of the interviews 
was to explore the placement of the program within each agency (see Table 7). Most of 
the departments of agriculture assessed during this research were sub-divided into 
discipline-specific divisions. Common divisions included animal health, executive, plant 
industries, food safety or inspection, and regulatory.  
The most common area for the homeland security program to be located 
within state departments of agriculture is in the executive division. Executive divisions 
tended to be those in which the agency administrator was located. The departments with 
stand-alone programs were ones in which a new division was created specifically to 
address homeland security initiatives. The informal programs were those in which a 
homeland security program was simply added to the duties of other employees and no 




Location of Program by Functional Area (N=24)  n  % 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Executive       15  62.5% 
Animal Health       2  8.33% 
Food        1  4.17% 
Stand-Alone       3  12.5% 
Informal        3  12.5% 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 7.   Placement of Program within Agency 
Some the respondents indicated direct reporting to the agency head while 
others reported to other members of the executive staff. All reported more benefits than 
barriers to this executive division placement. The concern associated with the placement 
of the homeland security program within the agency was that there is the potential ability 
of leaders to influence the types of activities undertaken by the program. The 
consequence of placing the homeland security program within a discipline-specific unit 
(e.g., animal health) was that it could restrict the focus from all potential hazards to a 
single area of concern. 
b. Formalized Internal Coordinating Group 
Many of the states indicated that their agency had an internal group that 
coordinated emergency response and homeland security programs. The name of the 
group varied from state to state, but the primary focus of this entity across all states was 
to engage members of all divisions in the development of homeland security initiatives. 
This approach reinforces the notion that homeland security is a mission of the entire 
agency and that it should focus on all hazards. 
Most of the states that had developed a coordinating group used this forum 
to bring subject matter experts together to discuss issues, conduct training, participate in 
exercises, and respond to incidents. Several of the states conducted monthly meetings to 
provide situational awareness to representatives of the different divisions. In most cases, 
members of this group would be the primary contacts within each of the divisions who 
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frequently served as the subject matter experts (SMEs) for agriculture incidents. The 
homeland security coordinator would be responsible for coordinating the activities of this 
group.   
3. Lateral Mechanisms 
The third element of the Galbraith’s Star Model assessed dealt with lateral 
mechanisms. This specific aspect deals with collaboration and the flow of information 
and the establishment of interpersonal networks. The primary focus of these research 
questions revolved around the interaction with external organizations.  
a. Multi-State Agriculture Groups 
This research also sought to evaluate the involvement of the respondents 
in the various multi-state agriculture groups in the United States. The primary groups 
identified were the Mid-Atlantic Agriculture and Animal Emergency Management 
Alliance (MAAEMA), the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture 
(Partnership), and the Southern Agriculture & Animal Disaster Response Alliance 
(SAADRA). Prior to conducting the interviews, a list of all of the states in each of the 
multi-state groups was developed. This enabled the researcher to focus questions on the  
specific multi-state organization. The breakdown of the groups (see Table 8) participating 
in the research was balanced between the Partnership and SAADRA, the two groups with 
the larger agriculture producing states.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Multi-State Agriculture Group  (N=24) n  % 
____________________________________________________________________ 
MAAEMA      3 (3)  12.5% 
Partnership      9 (13)  37.5% 
SAADRA       7 (7)  29.17% 
Not Involved      5 (9)  20.83% 
  
Note: Numbers inside parentheses are the number of states in each group originally contacted 
to participate in the research.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.   Participation in Multi-State Agriculture Group 
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Respondents described their involvement in the multi-state group and 
provided examples of the benefits of the collaborative initiative. Information collected 
suggests that there are tremendous benefits to these organizations. However, it does 
appear that not all of these organizations provide the same services to its members. The 
majority of the subjects indicated that the groups were very beneficial to their 
organizations.   
The Partnership appears to offer more than the other multi-state 
agriculture groups to its members. The most common benefit cited by Partnership 
members was the support provided to implement FAS-CAT.7 Almost without exception, 
members of the Partnership stated that they got more out of the organization than they put 
into it. The only complaints associated with the Partnership related to the flow of U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security funding.  
Members of the other organizations also expressed benefits of 
participation in these multi-state groups. Based upon the comments of those interviewed, 
however, there are not as many tangible benefits associated with either SAADRA or 
MAAEMA. An explanation of the different level of involvement might be associated 
with the maturity of the organizations. Members of the Partnership got together to form 
their organization in 2003, but both SAADRA and MAAEMA formed more recently. The 
identification of solutions to address funding problems and development of a mission 
focus are two benefits associated with the maturity of an organization and SAADRA and 
MAAEMA might not realize these benefits at the current time.  
In addition to the states already participating in a multi-state group, several 
expressed hope to form a group in their region. Those interested in participating in a 
program indicated that they have been in contact with other states to discuss the 
formation of a new agriculture initiative. Those interviewees indicated that they would be 
looking to existing models to identify how to best structure and fund these programs. One  
 
                                                 
7 Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FAS-CAT) is a computer system to help 
state-level decision makers determine critical assets in the food and agriculture. This computer program 
enables state departments of agriculture and private sector representatives to collect and evaluate critical 
infrastructure protection information related to the food and agriculture sector.  
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challenge they identified is getting people to serve as the driving force in the 
development of an agriculture group in their region. Many states will find it difficult to 
devote the time and effort to a new initiative.  
b. Involvement With the State Intelligence Fusion Center 
The participation of personnel in a State Intelligence Fusion Center is a 
new endeavor in homeland security programs. Fusion centers are an effective and 
efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence by merging data from a 
variety of sources. States and some larger cities have created fusion centers to share 
information and intelligence within their jurisdictions as well as with the federal 
government.  
Respondents reported a range of involvement from zero contact to having 
a presence within the fusion center (see Table 9). All of the respondents had an awareness 
of the fusion center in their state and understood its role in homeland security. The 
majority indicated a good to very good relationship with their state fusion center. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Participation in Fusion Center (N=24) n  % 
_______________________________________________________________ 
No Contact      2  8.33% 
Limited Contact     9  37.5% 
Regular Contact      11  45.83% 
Strong Partnership      2  8.33% 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Table 9.   Participation in Fusion Center 
A key point at each level of involvement was information sharing related 
to agriculture issues and threats. Those reporting no contact were aware of the 
intelligence fusion center but had not established any working relationships. Two states 
said that that the newness of the intelligence fusion center had limited their involvement. 
One respondent explained that the fusion center was simply something behind a locked 
door. These respondents indicated that developing and fostering the relationship would be 
beneficial to their programs. The greatest challenge reported was lack of time necessary 
to build this relationship. 
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In the states with little involvement in fusion centers, the interviewees 
reported establishing basic lines of communication but explained that there were not fully 
developed. Respondents suggested that they would like to become more involved in the 
fusion center. Part of the challenge related to lack of interest on both the parts of the state 
departments of agriculture and the fusion center. 
The majority of interviewees reported that their agencies were in regular 
contact with their state intelligence fusion center. In this level of interaction, a regular 
two-way communication effort exists related to agriculture issues. Based upon this 
analysis, the fusion centers provide information to agriculture agencies, and the personnel 
within the agriculture agency provide relevant information back to the fusion center. This 
would include daily briefs, threat assessments, and other reports.  
Two states explained that they have a very strong partnership with the 
fusion center. In fact, this working relationship had the potential to include the placement 
of agriculture analysts within the fusion center. The concern of many interviewees is that 
while there is the benefit of having an agriculture specialist within the fusion center, 
current budget problems of many agencies would make it difficult to justify the expense. 
Most are simply exploring ways to raise awareness levels of issues relevant to agriculture 
within fusion centers. 
The strongest objective to participating in a fusion center was the sharing 
of information related to the presence of an animal disease. For example, one respondent 
voiced concern about reporting information to the fusion center because of the 
dissemination policies of the fusion center. Publicizing the presence of an animal or plant 
disease, if not done properly, could result in unintended consequences associated with the 
loss of market and trade implications. This person understood that reports sent out from 
the fusion center were controlled but was still concerned about dissemination. 
c. Public-Private Partnerships 
Engagement of industry partners and other stakeholders is a critical 
element of the creation of lateral mechanisms. One potential approach would be creating 
public-private partnerships. Most of those interviewed indicated that these partnerships 
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are very beneficial in working through the FAS-CAT process. In fact, one state reported 
that the only benefit associated with FAS-CAT was the creation of these public-private 
partnerships. 
An intriguing example of a model public-private partnership is the 
Wisconsin Agro-Security Resource Network (WARN) program. The WARN initiative is 
comprised of governmental officials, trade organizations, extension service, and industry 
partners. The group “facilitates emergency preparedness between the agricultural sectors 
and government agencies. The WARN program serves as a clearing house and 
educational forum for producer-driven crisis preparedness materials and training and 
biosecurity programs” (WARN, 2010). A representative of WARN reported that the 
program is being recommended by the USDA to other agencies as a best practice. 
Another respondent reported efforts to adopt a similar program in that state.  
An additional program mentioned which, has been implemented by 
several states was Agro-Guard. It is a community-policing effort specifically designed for 
the agriculture industry based on a traditional neighborhood watch program. This 
partnership between industry and local law enforcement alerts officials of suspicious 
activities around agriculture and food sector facilities. Agro-Guard brings together many 
of the stakeholders needed for the development and implementation of agroterrorism 
prevention programs. One of the states reported that Agro-Guard “was one of the best 
endeavors ever started” (Interview 10-0009, March 3, 2010). 
4. Incentives  
Incentives refer to motivational techniques used to get members to support 
organizational goals and objectives. These incentives are the driving force for completing 
many of the activities that support the strategic direction of the organization. In a general 
sense, these incentives are designed to illicit specific behaviors such as compliance with 
NIMS requirements.  
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a. State Homeland Security Grant Program  
All of the respondents reported familiarity with the State Homeland 
Security Grant Program (SHSGP). In addition, all of the states applied for SHSGP funds 
to develop and implement agriculture-related homeland security programs. Obtaining 
homeland security funds to support programs and initiatives is a major issue for the state 
departments of agriculture. The amount of funding received by agriculture agencies has 
ranged from no support to large annual grants each year. The recipients explained that 
there has been big discrepancy in funding over the last several years along with a recent 
decline in amounts awarded. 
While the precise amount of money each of the state departments of 
agriculture received was not available, the total state acquisition of Department of 
Homeland Security funds was (see Figure 9). Six of the states interviewed received the 
minimum amount of funding. The majority of the states received approximately $10 
million or less in SHSGP funds. This chart highlights the disparity among the states in the 




Figure 9.   Comparison of SHSGP and Agriculture Receipts 
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Even though the amount obtained by the departments varies, all indicated 
having knowledge of the programs and met eligibility requirements to qualify for funds. 
Several states reported that they were unable to receive any funds and explained that this 
was due to the limited amount received by the state as well as specific grant requirements 
such as passing 80% of the funds to the local level. One state reported that many of the 
counties received the grant funds and then returned the money to the state level to 
develop programs for the local level.  
The precise programs and initiatives supported by the SHSGP funding 
also varied from state to state. Those states participating in the Multi-State Partnership for 
Security in Agriculture reported funding to support the activities of the group. The 
information collected during the interviews also suggests that many of the grant-funded 
programs focus on specific programs such as the development of pet sheltering 
capabilities, enhancing laboratory safety, and purchasing equipment and supplies for 
response activities. As expected, all of the respondents expressed the need for additional 
monies to maintain existing activities or to implement new programs.  
Several states have been able to create positions funded by the homeland 
security funds. These positions tended to focus on mission specific tasks: development of 
response plans, creating pet sheltering capabilities, or continuity of operations planning. 
This was a concern because there was little to no assurance that the positions would be 
long-term. This uncertainty presents challenges associated with being able to hire the 
most qualified personnel and being able to develop continuity in programs.  
5. People 
The final element of Galbraith’s Star Model deals with people. This area focused 
on the presence of homeland security personnel and necessary training. The research 
questions addressing this aspect focused on the presence of homeland security personnel.  
a. Homeland Security Coordinator 
All of the states reported having an individual whose primary role was to 
coordinate the homeland security initiatives within state departments of agriculture. 
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Many of these individuals work full-time on emergency planning and homeland security 
programs, but others worked on these efforts as part of a larger responsibility. Those who 
worked on homeland security as part of their other duties as assigned frequently 
complained of competing demands and diminishing time.  
Those agencies with a dedicated position stressed the benefit of being able 
to enhance the presence of agriculture to the homeland security community. In most 
cases, this individual represented the agriculture agency on all statewide homeland 
security committees and frequently responded to the emergency operations center (EOC) 
during emergencies. While these meetings increased the workload, most saw them as a 
way of bringing agriculture issues to the forefront of statewide emergency planning 
activities.   
This research did not seek to identify the background of those 
participating in the research. However, this research did determine that the participants’ 
tenure in their organization ranged from a few months to over 30 years. Many of the 
individuals were existing department employees transferred to their current position and 
given responsibility for homeland security and emergency planning. While the majority 
had some agriculture experience, several had backgrounds within the emergency 
planning discipline. In all cases, reliance upon the agriculture subject matter experts 
within the various divisions was common.  
b. Personnel  
In terms of organizational aspects, the number of people and their roles 
and responsibilities within the homeland security program are relevant. Information on 
personnel focused on the number of people with direct responsibilities related to 
homeland security and not designed to identify the number of people that potentially 
could be involved in an incident response. This research suggests that agencies with 
personnel devoted to homeland security will be more likely to accomplish objective 
outlined in the state homeland security strategic plan, and ultimately be better prepared.  
The number of people specifically assigned to homeland security program 
is generally small (see Table 10). On average, less than three people per agency work on 
 63
these programs. Ten states reported having a single person assigned to homeland security. 
On the other end of the spectrum, one program reported an approximate staff of 25 
people. 
____________________________________________________________ 
Number of Employees (N=24)     
____________________________________________________________ 
Average Number     2.83 staff members 
 
1 staff member     12 agencies 
2 staff members     6 agencies 
3 staff members     2 agencies 
4 staff members     1 agency 
5 or more staff members    3 agencies 
____________________________________________________________ 
Table 10.   Number of Employees in Homeland Security Programs 
This analysis looked only at homeland security professionals and support 
staff. Several states have law enforcement capabilities within the department of 
agriculture, and while these officers do reflect the homeland security presence in the state 
department of agriculture, they were not the homeland security professionals associated 
with this research. Several states reported personnel challenges when declining state 
budgets were forcing states to reduce staff and place personnel on furlough.  
c. Training and Exercises 
Training and exercises were two issues frequently identified as critical to 
the success of homeland security programs. Incident command system (ICS) training and 
exercises commonly concerned the participants. Nearly all of them identified ICS training 
and National Incident Management System (NIMS) requirements as a challenge. While 
most agencies stipulated that staff complete basic NIMS and ICS courses (ICS-100 and 
ICS-200), several respondents complained there was not an agreed upon level of training 
necessary for agriculture responders. Many of the states that are members of Multi-State 
Partnership for Security in Agriculture had taken advantage of advanced ICS training 
(ICS-420). There is a concern among many of the respondents related to maintaining ICS 
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proficiency of staff given the limited number of times there have been agriculture 
emergencies, thus supporting the if you do not use it, you lose it philosophy.  
Many of the participants also identified the benefit of U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security programs related to agriculture. Examples of these programs included 
training provided by the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (LSU), 
the Western Institute for Food Safety and Security (UC Davis), Kirkwood Community 
College, and other DHS Centers of Excellence. Several respondents also indicated the 
value of the WMD Basic Agriculture Emergency Responder Training course at the 
Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama.  
Another major complaint area was insufficient training specifically 
targeted at agriculture. Much of this criticism centered on the lack of many DHS 
representatives and contractors agriculture knowledge. Several interviewees explained 
that DHS frequently did not understand the realities of state departments of agriculture in 
terms of capabilities or training. One person reported that a DHS contractor assigned to 
develop an agriculture exercise “did not know one end of the horse from the other” 
(Interview 10-0009, March 3, 2010). 
C. IDENTIFIED BARRIERS 
Barriers relate to programs or obstacles that limit homeland security programs 
within the state departments of agriculture. The respondents were asked a series of 
questions which were designed to identify obstacles to program implementation along the 
elements of Galbraith’s Star Model. Factors that restricted the success of programs and 
initiatives were determined to be barriers.  
1. Strategy 
a. State-Federal Disconnect  
The most common complaint among the interviewees was that there has 
been a lack of guidance from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to state 
departments of agriculture on how to develop homeland security programs. One 
interviewee stated, “The success of state departments of agriculture in the development of 
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homeland security programs is due to state initiative and not federal leadership” 
(Interview 10-0012, February 23, 2010). Another respondent reported being 
“disillusioned with the entire process” (Interview 10-0024, May 6, 2010). Several others 
made similar statements and repeatedly commented about a disconnect between DHS and 
the agriculture community.  
Respondents seemed to have additional issues with quantity and quality of 
federal guidance related to homeland security programs. One of the respondents noted 
concern about the lack of guidance or even worse, uninformed guidance. A different 
interviewee expressed similar frustration in relationship to one of the DHS Centers of 
Excellence, when the interviewee asked, “What are we getting out of these initiatives” 
and then wondered, “Are these products really needed?” (Interview 10-0021, March 4, 
2010). Another interviewee complained, “No one asks the state on how things should be 
done” (Interview 10-0008, March 9, 2010). 
One frequent sentiment was that the federal government did not 
understand the realities of states, specifically the realities of state departments of 
agriculture. Respondents gave examples of programs and exercises that supported this 
disconnect. One respondent stated, “They [DHS] were clueless on agriculture issues” 
(Interview 10-0009, March 3, 2010). A central theme running through many of the 
interviews was that the US Department of Homeland Security lacked the leadership 
necessary to build up the role of agriculture in homeland security. The respondents 
suggested this disconnect as a sign that DHS does not take agroterrorism threats seriously 
and that the federal government does not understand the importance of agriculture.  
The development of new mandates on state government was another issue 
raised by the respondents. Examples of these programs were compliance with pet 
sheltering requirements and the participation in critical infrastructure (i.e., FAS-CAT) 
programs. Many of the participants explained that there was inadequate federal support 
related to these programs. One interviewee stated, “We need federal support…the Feds 




concern raised during many of the interviews is that the federal government appears to be 
moving away from collaboration in the development and implementation of homeland 
security programs. Clovis succinctly explained,  
The tone and directness moved from partnering and facilitation to 
dictating more and more requirements for compliance with non-legislated 
regulatory regimes based on limited theoretical development and no 
appreciation for the impact in dollars and labor on state and local officials 
charged with public safety, emergency management, and homeland 
security responsibilities. (2008, p. 4) 
b. Critical Infrastructure Programs 
The connection between agriculture and critical infrastructure programs 
presents other challenges for state departments of agriculture. Many states expressed 
concern about the lack of information provided to them for dealing with critical 
infrastructure. According to participants, the state departments of agriculture did not have 
enough information to complete critical infrastructure assessments. The challenge, as 
with many of the critical infrastructure initiatives, is getting the industry to provide the 
necessary information to develop protection programs.  
Another obstacle is that critical infrastructure programs tend to focus on 
assets and not the typical systems (the interconnection of disparate assets). The systems-
based approach in the food and agriculture sector presented many problems related to 
annual data calls during which states upload critical infrastructure information into a 
DHS database. A common criticism of many respondents related to the lack of 
understanding of the interconnections within the food and agriculture sector. One 
respondent likened the food and agriculture sector to a web or a chain-linked fence. The 
individual explained that if you remove one link the entire system falls apart. The 
complaint was that DHS just did not understand how all of the pieces came together  
The development and implementation of FAS-CAT is one of those 
programs that evoked a range of response. Most of the respondents understood the intent 
of the FAS-CAT initiative from a federal perspective but were unable to identify a benefit 
to the state. A common sentiment was that the state received no benefit from using FAS-
CAT. To suggest that there was great frustration over FAS-CAT is to put it mildly.  
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During the roll out of the new version of FAS-CAT (which took place 
during the period of time these interviews were being conducted), many of the 
respondents were able to take part in a training Webinar on the new software. However, 
the tool was not available to the states, and the web-based version (which would be 
required for submission) was under development. The states discovered that the FAS-
CAT was not compatible with the Infrastructure Data Collection Application (the DHS 
critical infrastructure database) and therefore not suitable for uploading critical 
infrastructure information. This was taking place less than three weeks before the data 
was required.  
Many of the states, already facing challenges associated with limited staff, 
pointed to this situation as a sign of disconnect. The respondents interviewed after the 
Webinar complained that DHS has adequate resources and personnel to work on these 
projects, but the states, on other hand, lack the staff to work on these initiatives under 
these deadlines. In addition to personnel challenges, the states repeatedly questioned the 
value of the process and the relevance of the data collected.  
c. Target Capabilities 
Another issue related to the disconnect between the federal government 
and state departments of agriculture was the reference to the Target Capabilities List. In 
December 2003, President Bush released Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 to 
establish national policy related to strengthening preparedness. This required the  
development of the National Preparedness Guidelines. These guidelines were comprised 
of three elements: the National Planning Scenarios, the Target Capabilities List (TCL), 
and the Universal Task List (UTL). 
This research did not seek to determine the level of involvement of state 
departments of agriculture related to these three areas. Only one state mentioned the 
connection between the TCL and their agency’s role in homeland security. Given the lack 
of direct questions related to the TCL, it is impossible to draw too many conclusions. If 
the TCL serves as a “framework to guide operational readiness planning, priority setting, 
and program implementation at all levels of government” (DHS, 2007, p. iii), the lack of 
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reference does raise some concerns. The TCL contains two specific references to 
agriculture: food and agriculture safety and defense and animal disease emergency 
support. These two capabilities identify desired activities and outcomes. The lack of 
reference is a potential example of a disconnect between expectations of DHS and the 
realities of state departments of agriculture.  
A part of the explanation for the lack of reference to these national 
planning guidance documents is that many of the requirements contained in the TCL are 
unrealistic and unattainable (DHS, 2003; Clovis, 2008). Based upon this research, many 
of the staffing and resource requirements would not be present in any individual state, 
and even the capabilities of a regional approach would like not be sufficient. Respondents 
reported that a large-scale outbreak (even when contained within a single state) would 
create ripple effects across the nation. The primary focus of all states would be to control 
the situation within their own state before responding to a crisis elsewhere.  
2. Structure 
a. Maintaining Silos 
While most of the interviewees acknowledged acceptance of agriculture as 
a member of the homeland security community, there was still a sense of being a lower 
class member. Even though most states have made great progress in adopting an all-
hazards approach, several respondents reported continuing problems related to including 
agriculture in other aspects of homeland security. One of the interviewees explained that 
instead of tearing down the walls between the disciplines, that U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security was building new silos.  
One of the participants mentioned the need for “cross pollination” of 
agriculture issues within the homeland security community. A concern is the homeland 
security community’s lack of involvement in agriculture. The majority of the participants 
explained that they frequently reached out to other agencies to be involved in training and 
exercises, but, at the same time, many mentioned their limited involvement in other 
organizations’ activities.  
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b. National Focus on Acts of Terror 
Many of the respondents expressed frustration over the dominant focus of 
program on acts of terrorism and not on the natural spread or accidental introduction of 
diseases. Several interviewees explained that the sole focus on acts of terrorism was 
additional proof that DHS did not understand agriculture. In research related to 
challenges to national preparedness, Clovis explained, “This divergence in perspective 
[sole focus on acts of terrorism] has led to ever-increasing tensions between the national 
government and state and local governments when policies related to homeland security 
national preparedness are at issue” (2008, p. 1).  
Several of the participants explained that the greatest threat facing states 
was not likely acts of terrorism but naturally occurring incidents. While understanding 
the consequences of a terrorist act, the respondents explained that their plans typically 
concern disease outbreaks. In one worst-case scenario, one state addressed the 
simultaneous spread of FMD into several feedlots. This approach, according to the 
respondent, was not to focus on an act of terrorism, but instead, the driving force was to 
examine typical animal movement patterns between feedlots. 
3. Lateral Mechanisms  
a. Multi-State Agriculture Groups 
Even though nearly all of the respondents reported benefits associated the 
multi-state agriculture groups, most identified time commitments to these groups as an 
area of concern. The highest level of time commitment seemed to be associated with the 
Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture because of the many programs that the 
organization provides to its members. While this presented an obstacle, it did not 
dissuade them from acknowledging the overall benefits of the organization; however, it 
does create a challenge to organizations with limited staff.  
There were also some critics associated with these organizations. One 
interviewee explained that the regional organizations were too much talk and not enough 
action. This individual wanted to see more direct action and tangible benefits before 
agreeing to participate in the organization. Another individual, whose state was a member 
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of a regional group, commented that regionalization might be overdone. This person did 
not understand how working with other states would benefit their agency in training or 
incident response.  
b. Information Sharing 
Another obstacle identified related to communication barriers and the lack 
of information sharing programs between DHS and state agencies. Frequently comments 
related to programs such as FAS-CAT. Many respondents reported communication 
barriers associated the development and implementation of homeland security programs 
with several specifically indicating that the greatest challenge related to critical 
infrastructure programs. One respondent felt that balancing both the agriculture and 
homeland security disciplines prohibited the free flow of information because their 
program seemed to fall between the cracks.  
4. Incentives  
a. Limited Funds 
Nearly all of the participants identified funding as the greatest barrier to 
accomplishing more homeland security initiatives. This issue included both state 
budgetary funding and State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) funds. Many of 
the respondents reported that both of these funding streams were declining. They referred 
to the recent DHS decision to change from competitive grants to straight allocation based on 
legislatively mandated minimums, the DHS’ risk methodology; and program effectiveness 
has decreased the funds made available to each state.  
One of the respondents indicated that agriculture programs do not get an 
equal amount of funding as other initiatives. “Most of the money goes to prevent things 
that ‘go boom’ and agriculture does not get much,” explained one respondent (Interview 
10-0006, February 22, 2010). Another respondent said that part of the problem is that 
“agriculture is still new” to homeland security (Interview 10-0020, March 3, 2010). 
Nearly all of the respondents reported keeping agriculture issues in front of their State 
Administrative Agency (SAA) in case SHSGP funds become available.  
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Many of the respondents reported that the limited amount of funding has 
forced their agency to be creative in the use of grants. This creativity relates to the 
development and implementation of regional programs. One state developed a 
collaborative initiative in which homeland security funds would be passed down to the 
county-level and then the county would turn over the money to the state department of 
agriculture to develop agriculture programs which would be implemented on the local 
level. While this is a laudable approach, it relies on the county to see the value of 
agriculture in its jurisdiction.  
A concern related to the SHSGP funds is that many of the more rural 
states do not receive an equal share of homeland security monies. In 2010, 21 states 
received the legislatively mandated minimum ($6,613,200) including six of the states 
interviewed for this research. This presents many challenges and underscores the position 
that agriculture interests are not valued highly within the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. A comparison of SHSGP funds and agriculture receipts (see Figure 9) supports 
the claim of many respondents that homeland security funds do not support the threats 
connected to agroterrorism. 
5. People 
a. Limited Personnel 
The majority of all interviewees reported the lack of personnel as a 
challenge to homeland security programs (see Table 10). A new concern facing many of 
the states relates to mandatory furlough days. Even states not facing furloughs expressed 
concerns about keeping funding levels constant, so they can maintain staffing levels; 
many explained that expanding staffing positions was doubtful. Nearly all of the 
respondents reported that they would like to hire additional staff members. Some of the 
individuals interviewed explained that they are looking at SHSGP funds to support 
staffing problems but recognized the challenges associated with these grants. 
Most of the respondents reported taking some steps in the development 
and implementation of pet-related programs, but the amount of involvement varied 
dramatically. Several respondents explained that they had hired staff to support these 
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initiatives; others reported reliance on volunteers. Examples of programs to support these 
pet sheltering initiatives were state animal response teams (SARTs) and county animal 
response team (CARTs). Additional examples of involvement included helping develop 
response plans incorporating pets and using homeland security grant funds to purchase 
equipment and supplies in the support of pet care activities.  
b. Lack of Qualified Personnel 
Several respondents discussed the importance of cross-utilization of 
employees during emergencies and exercises. One of the obstacles is that some of the 
disciplines within agriculture do not have similar skill sets. For instance, a respondent 
explained that many of the employees in food inspection, meat inspection, and dairy 
programs all require similar skills and training; however, the respondent stated that skills 
sets of plant industries staff would not be well suited for a food-related incident. Many of 
the other states, however, reported training staff members for all types of agriculture 
incidents.  
D.  SUMMARY OF SUCCESS FACTORS AND BARRIERS 
The research identified success factors and barriers related to the development of 
homeland security programs within state departments of agriculture (see Table 11). These 
elements are centered around the organization design components associated with 




Success Factors Barriers 
Strategy All-hazards 
Common goal in the State 
Homeland Security Strategy 
Adaptable to interest of other 
organizations 
ESF approach (Role clarity) 
Target Capabilities List (Role 
clarity) 
 
DHS lack of agriculture 
knowledge 
Lack of goal clarity – state-
federal disconnect 
Focus on discipline-specific 
programs 
Programs built in isolation 
 
Structure Program focuses on entire agency 
(all-hazards) 
Program coordinator (homeland 
security position) 
Coordinated internal planning 
activities 
Formalized coordination through 
agriculture groups 
Role clarity (ESF approach) 
Dedicated assets (internal planning 
groups) 
 
Maintaining “silo” approach 
Inadequate resources 
Lack of agency support 
National focus on terror (non 
risk-based approach) 
Obligations to complete multiple 




Collaboration in multi-state 
agriculture group 
Information sharing with fusion 
centers 
Technical interoperability (through 
agriculture groups) 




DHS disconnect with state 
departments of agriculture 
Communication barriers (no 
information sharing) 
Obligations to complete 
collaboration tasks 
Lack of participation in multi-
agency organization 
Still building “silos” 
Incentives Collaboration 
Regionalization approach to get 
more DHS funding 





Limited State Homeland Security 
Grant Program funds 
DHS focus on urban areas (hurts 
agriculture) 
Competition for limited resources 
(DHS funding) 




Issues in bold are primary success 
factors and barriers and are 
discussed in detail in this research. 
Professionalism (personnel) 
Reliance on agency subject matter 
experts 
Training and exercises 
Dedicated to agriculture and state 
 
Multiple job duties (HLS is not the 
only hat) 
Lack of personnel (specifically 
dedicated to HLS) 
Lack of understanding of 
agriculture issues (DHS) 
Lack of competency of federal 
government (do not 
understand state level 
realities) 
Table 11.   Summary of Factors Affecting Organization 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Data are ways of expressing things, and information is the arrangement 
of data into meaningful patterns. Knowledge is the application and 
productive use of information, and wisdom, finally, is the discerning use 
of knowledge. 
Davis & Botkin, 1995, p. 42 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Agroterrorism is a real concern facing the United States. The very nature of 
agriculture makes it open to attack. The vulnerabilities of agriculture, including animals, 
plants, and the food supply, are located at all points along the “farm to fork” continuum. 
While most experts agree that even though the economy would likely be the primary 
target during an agroterrorism attack, there could be some potential human health effects.  
The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security have been incorporating agriculture in many of the federal homeland security 
initiatives. Many of the efforts to protect agriculture have been included in the National 
Response Framework and the accompanying Emergency Support Function #11. 
Activities associated with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan list agriculture as 
one of the most vital industrial sectors in the United States. These federal initiatives 
should support and be supported by efforts on the local level. Therefore, there is a need to 
create a framework that enhances the joint efforts of state and federal agencies. 
State departments of agriculture, however, have not uniformly developed 
homeland security programs. In most cases, the placement of homeland security 
programs within specific units often forces agencies to develop a narrow programmatic 
focus. While the most threats relate to animal diseases, the location of the program in 
certain administrative units limits their scope. This can be seen in the exclusion of certain 
aspects of the food and agriculture sector from common planning approaches.  
Through the evaluation of homeland security programs within state departments 
of agriculture, numerous examples of success factors emerged. As one state reported, 
however, “The success of state departments of agriculture in the development of 
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homeland security programs is due to state initiative and not federal leadership” 
(Interview 10-0012, February 23, 2010). Respondents suggested that factors like 
collaboration, public-private partnerships, and organizational structure led to the 
successful development and implementation of homeland security programs. 
This research was also able to identify many of the challenges facing state 
departments of agriculture in the development of homeland security programs. The most 
common barriers were associated with lack of information sharing, a disconnect between 
the federal and state government, and inadequate funding. To overcome these barriers, 
the implementation of a series of recommendations is critical.  
The uniqueness relating to the roles and responsibilities of state departments of 
agriculture makes the development of a single model program problematic. It is, 
however, possible to identify elements of a model program that state departments of 
agriculture could selectively implement. These elements include placement of the 
program within the agency, the focus of the program, and involvement in collaborative 
initiatives. The recommendations of this research offer solutions to many of the 
challenges facing state departments of agriculture. 
This chapter presents recommendations for enhancing the capabilities of 
homeland security programs within state departments of agriculture. While not all 
elements are applicable to all agencies, these recommendations offer potential solutions 
and are aimed at state departments of agriculture, state homeland security agencies, and 
the federal government.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research identified success factors and barriers to homeland security 
programs within state departments of agriculture. Based upon the analysis of the 
interviews a series of recommendations are being proposed. Using a modified version of 
Galbraith’s Star Model, it is possible to link organizational design components and 
success factors and barriers (see Figure 10). The five elements of the Star Model 
interweave to control and shape the behavior of the organization (see point A). In turn, 
this behavior affects performance and culture. All of these elements directly influence 
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implementation of success factors and the presence of barriers. These activities have the 
potential to influence the organization and then shape performance and culture (see point 
B). In essence, the organizational factors (Star Model) produce the opportunities in which 
the implementation of success factors is possible. The feedback loop (see point C) will 
contain the elements of a model program. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Modified Galbraith Star and Success Factors (From Galbraith, 2009) 
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1. Strategy 
a. Proposal 1: Develop an All Hazard Approach 
Homeland security programs within state departments of agriculture must 
address all hazards. In most agricultural agencies, this would include animals, plants, and 
food. Building around all hazards is critical to preparing for and responding to all of the 
threats associated with agroterrorism. It is critical that the organization design ensure that 
all activities should support the all hazards focus. The state departments of agriculture 
must coordinate this all-hazards approach with all relevant stakeholders in government 
and the private sector.  
b. Proposal 2: Include Agriculture in Homeland Security Strategy  
Agriculture issues should be included in the State Homeland Security 
Strategy. Representatives of the state departments of agriculture must work closely with 
the State Administrative Agency (SAA) to ensure that the State Homeland Security 
Strategy contains relevant goals and objectives related to agriculture. The key to this 
process is to strengthen the relationship between the department of agriculture and the 
SAA. The inclusion of agriculture would support elements of the Target Capabilities List 
and is critical to the all-hazards approach needed. Building this connection to include 
agriculture within broader homeland security issues is a continuous process.  
c. Proposal 3: Communicate Agriculture Needs   
State departments of agriculture need to initiate interaction with 
agriculture policy makers like the National Association of State Departments of 
Agriculture (NASDA), representatives of the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating 
Council, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Policy makers need to 
understand the importance of agriculture and the importance of collaboration if the 
regional groups are to be successful. It is critical that issues discussed on a planning level 




agriculture community. An additional element of this communication relates to 
developing an understanding of the needs and capabilities of state departments of 
agriculture. 
d. Proposal 4: Participate in Critical Infrastructure Programs 
State departments of agriculture need to become engaged in critical 
infrastructure protection programs and work with the state coordinating group and private 
industry. The initial step is for the state departments of agriculture to identify 
stakeholders representing the critical infrastructure within the food and agriculture sector. 
Another key is for members of the food and agriculture sector to work within the 
homeland security community to ensure that statewide critical infrastructure programs 
include agriculture interests. Part of this involvement would be to engage private industry 
and other critical infrastructure as partners in the developing a process to use FAS-CAT 
in agriculture infrastructure assessments.  
2. Structure 
a. Proposal 5: Place Program Within Executive Branch 
The findings of this research suggest that the location of the homeland 
security program within state departments of agriculture is critical to the success of the 
program. Specifically, the program should be located within the executive unit of the 
state department of agriculture. This placement would provide overall agency perspective 
necessary to coordinate the activities of the different disciplines. All internal and external 
partners must see this position as representing the entire agency. Another argument for 
the executive branch placement is that if the homeland security program lies within a 
specific discipline, it is possible that agency would develop too narrow of a focus. 
Individuals interviewed indicated that placing the homeland security program outside the 
traditional disciplines (i.e., animal health, plants, or food) is critical to overall success.  
b. Proposal 6: Create of Emergency Planning Liaison Program 
The research recommends state departments of agriculture create an 
internal planning and response group to coordinate all agency operations. This program 
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should include members from all of the disciplines represented in the agency and should 
hold regular meetings and training sessions. Members would be the subject matter 
experts who would provide technical support to the emergency operations. These 
individuals would also serve as the primary contacts within each division. The focus of 
this agroterrorism planning group should be on all hazards related to the food and 
agriculture sector. A function of these individuals would be to provide a conduit for 
training needs to be passed from the homeland security program to all relevant 
department employees.  
3. Lateral Mechanisms 
a. Proposal 7: Engage in Activities With the SAA 
The research also indicates that state departments of agriculture should 
build a relationship with the State Administrative Agency (SAA). This participation 
should foster two-way communications and strengthen the place of agriculture within the 
homeland security community. This involvement should trigger mechanisms for 
including agriculture in the State Homeland Security Strategy and in other homeland 
security initiatives within the state. It is critical that the SAA and other agencies 
understand the role of the state departments of agriculture as a member of the statewide 
homeland security community.   
b. Proposal 8: Engage in Fusion Center Activities 
An analysis of this research recommends that state departments of 
agriculture participate in the State Intelligence Fusion Center. This participation should 
support information sharing related to agroterrorism threats. Not all state departments of 
agriculture will need to hire an analyst to work in the fusion center, but it is important to 
develop the contacts in order to make some direct involvement possible. This provides 
the fusion center staff with an understanding of what threat information is relevant to 
agriculture agencies as well as for the fusion center to provide the state departments of 
agriculture with an understanding of what information they can provide back up to the 
fusion center.  
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An element of enhancing working relationships with the intelligence 
fusion center is the creation of a Terrorism Liaison Officer position within state 
departments of agriculture. The TLO is a functional position and acts as the lead 
coordinator on issues related to terrorism. Typically, the TLO fulfills a range of duties 
including an interagency representative, a subject matter expert, and a terrorism 
intelligence analyst. This position would create an important link to the fusion center and 
the intelligence community.  
c. Proposal 9: Participate in Multi-state Agriculture Group  
Participation in multi-state agriculture groups is essential for the success 
of the homeland security programs within state departments of agriculture. Gordon 
argues, “It is not possible to defend American agriculture against foreign or domestic 
terrorism if multi-state collaborative initiatives focused on food security [and other 
elements of the food and agriculture sector] are not developed” (2004, p. 39). This 
research and other studies related to regionalization suggest that this approach provides a 
synergistic benefit to member agencies. State departments of agriculture should devote 
resources to support the activities of these multi-state agriculture groups. In regions 
where there is not an established organization, the state should continue discussing the 
development of a multi-state agriculture organization.  
Simply having multi-state agriculture group is not enough. These 
organizations need to connect a dedicated funding stream, have a defined focus, and be 
able to provide tangible benefits to its members. According to research conducted by 
Gordon: 
To be effective the partnership should have strong principles and 
objectives. It should create a system for states to participate in joint 
planning, education, training and exercise opportunities to build a unified 
approach in building state and federal surveillance and response capacity; 
it should promote awareness of agro-security issues within all levels of 
government; it should improve coordination and information sharing 
among agencies at the federal, state and local levels to prevent and 
respond as well as develop joint strategies for maintaining public and 
consumer confidence. (Gordon, 2004, p. 2)  
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While these organizations all provide some benefits to members, it is clear 
that some are further along in complying with the items identified by Gordon. Existing 
and any new organizations need to remain vigilant to the needs of the member states, and 
member agencies need to communicate training and planning needs to the multi-state 
agriculture groups. 
d. Proposal 10: Form Agriculture Public-Private Partnership 
The research also recommends that state departments of agriculture form 
public-private partnerships. This group should be something like the Wisconsin 
Agroterrorism Resource Network (WARN), Agro-Guard, or an ESF-11 task force and 
should include members of state and local government, law enforcement, and private 
industry. Developing a mechanism through which all stakeholders can communicate and 
collaborate is the primary intent of these public-private partnerships.  
Budgetary problems might present some challenges related to these types 
of organizations. However, the ability to collaborate on the development of programs 
does have the potential to lessen the economic burden of individual agencies. Successful 
programs will require involving private industry. These programs need to be separate 
from the typical regulatory emphasis of many state departments of agriculture. The intent 
of these public-private partnerships is to develop solutions to the challenges agriculture 
faces related to agroterrorism.  
e. Proposal 11: Create a State-Level Agro-Security Council 
The research recommends that state departments of agriculture form a 
state-level agro-security council (or public-private partnership, see above). The agro-
security council should include representation of federal, state, and local governments. 
An essential role of this group is to coordinate the development of agriculture-related 
response plans and to ensure that responders have adequate training and equipment. 
Membership in this group needs to be diverse. Representatives should include 
agriculture, public health, mental health, emergency management, extension service, 
fusion center, law enforcement, and other relevant agencies.   
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f. Proposal 12: Enhance Information Sharing  
Many of the respondents identified the lack of shared information and the 
federal-state disconnect as barriers to the development of homeland security programs. 
This information sharing should occur between all levels of government and should 
involve the private sector. Many of the respondents complained that the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security was not adequately sharing information, and this was creating 
problems related to the development and implementation of programs. 
4. Incentives  
a. Proposal 13: Maintain Eligibility to Receive SHSGP Funds  
The state departments of agriculture need to maintain eligibility to receive 
SHSGP funds. While this typically would be a good policy decision, several states 
indicated that they were not sure of eligibility requirements and were not familiar with 
the process for applying for homeland security funding. Working with the SAA to 
maintain familiarity and compliance with the SHSGP eligibility would enable the agency 
to apply for funding when the opportunities exist.   
An element of this approach is that state departments of agriculture take an 
active role in evaluating grant applications related to food and agriculture. For instance, 
the state departments of agriculture should be consultants on investment justifications 
related to pet sheltering. The SAA should rely on the state departments of agriculture as a 
subject matter expert in the development and implementation of food and agriculture 
sector investments.  
b. Proposal 14: Provide Funding to Multi-State Agriculture Groups  
The research has shown that the multi-state agriculture groups are valuable 
to the completion of many homeland security initiatives. The challenge facing many state 
departments of agriculture is how to provide funding to multi-state agriculture groups. 
States face limits in the amount of funding available through SHSGP. In many cases, 




region, one state was willing to provide funding to the MAAEMA but none of the other 
states could contribute. The challenge is that SHSGP funds are decreasing while the 
demand is still increasing.  
Several states recommended that the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security evaluate its policy of providing direct funding to these groups. This would mean 
that the money used to fund these multi-state agriculture initiatives would not compete 
for other state projects. Obviously, the money would have to come from other sources, 
and that has the potential to create problems related to homeland security programs. The 
state departments of agriculture, however, understood that providing direct funding was 
simply a way to work around SHSGP restrictions.  
5. People 
a. Proposal 15: Create Homeland Security Coordinator Position 
This research identified the importance of an individual to coordinate the 
implementation and development of homeland security programs within the state 
department of agriculture. This person should serve as the conduit for all internal and 
external interaction. The roles and responsibilities should include serving as the liaison to 
the state emergency operations center and the state intelligence fusion center.  
b. Proposal 16: Develop Agriculture Training Programs 
The research participants identified the importance of agriculture training 
and exercise programs. A common concern was that DHS and the USDA had not enough 
agriculture-specific homeland security training. Part of the development of exercises and 
training is for the federal government to reach out to the state departments of agriculture 
in an effort to understand their needs. State departments of agriculture should also take 
advantage of existing training opportunities available through the DHS and the USDA.  
Many state departments of agriculture are facing a challenge relating to 
incident command training and exercises. While some states have been able to provide 
adequate ICS training, the concern is maintaining proficiency in the use of ICS. The time 
and effort necessary to develop relevant ICS for agriculture agencies is forcing some 







Strategy Proposal 1: Develop an All-hazards Approach 
Proposal 2: Include Agriculture in the State Homeland Security 
Strategy 
Proposal 3: Communicate Agriculture Planning Needs Related to 
Homeland Security 
Proposal 4: Participate in Critical Infrastructure Programs 
Structure Proposal 5: Place Program Within Executive Branch of the State 
Department of Agriculture 
Proposal 6: Create An Agriculture Emergency Planning Liaison 
Program   
Lateral Mechanisms Proposal 7: Engage in Activities with the SAA 
Proposal 8: Engage in Fusion Center Activities 
Proposal 9: Participate in Multi-State Agriculture Group 
Proposal 10: Form Agriculture Public-Private Partnerships 
Proposal 11: Create a State-level Agro-Security Council  
Proposal 12: Enhance Information Sharing Among Stakeholders 
Incentives Proposal 13: Maintain Eligibility to Receive Homeland Security 
Grant Programs 
Proposal 14: Provide DHS Funding to Multi-state agriculture groups 
People Proposal 15: Create Homeland Security Coordinator Position 
Proposal 16: Develop Agriculture Training Programs 
Table 12.   Summary Table of Recommendations
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C. PROGRAM EVALUATION 
The evaluation of a homeland security program provides a useful approach to 
identify the presence of success factors in specific state department of agriculture 
programs.  To assist in assessment, an evaluation checklist was developed to enable state 
department of agriculture a means to select which recommendations to implement. 
Specifically, a “checklist provides an efficient and user-friendly format to share such 
lessons learned” (Wingate, 2002, p. 1). Information collected during this research was 
used to generate an evaluation tool (see Appendix D: Evaluation Checklist). This 
evaluation tool provides a mechanism for state departments of agriculture to perform a 
self-evaluation of homeland security programs. Agencies can utilize this checklist to 
identify programmatic areas (i.e., strategy, structure, later mechanisms, incentives, and 
people) which need to be addressed.   
D. MODEL PROGRAM 
There is no single model program that could be implemented in all state 
departments of agriculture. The roles and responsibilities of state departments of 
agriculture are so different that it is not possible to create a single model. It is possible, 
however, to develop a series of program elements or initiatives that state departments of 
agriculture could implement. The recommendations outlined in this chapter are elements 
of a homeland security program. Not all suggested elements will work in every state. 
However, these recommendations do provide some guidance as states evaluate the 
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APPENDIX A: TOTAL AGRICULTURE RECEIPTS 
This appendix contains the list of total agriculture receipts for each state. This analysis 
uses data collected by the USDA Economic Research Service. The focus of this research 
was on the 32 states with the highest agriculture receipts.  
 
Rank State Value ($1,000) % of U.S. 
 
1. California 31,835,183  13.20%  
2. Texas 16,498,398  6.84%  
3. Iowa 14,652,946  6.07%  
4. Nebraska 11,779,728  4.88%  
5. Minnesota 9,794,912  4.06%  
6. Illinois 9,708,304  4.02%  
7. Kansas 9,502,727  3.94%  
8. North Carolina 8,210,497  3.40%  
9. Wisconsin 6,864,150  2.85%  
10. Florida 6,843,731  2.84%  
11. Arkansas 6,604,400  2.74%  
12. Georgia 6,107,025  2.53%  
13. Indiana 6,043,191  2.51%  
14. Washington 5,868,196  2.43%  
15. Missouri 5,818,727  2.41%  
16. Colorado 5,501,155  2.28%  
17. Ohio 5,459,380  2.26%  
18. Oklahoma 5,054,570  2.10%  
19. South Dakota 4,877,484  2.02%  
20. Pennsylvania 4,859,336  2.01%  
21. Idaho 4,349,253  1.80%  
22. Michigan 4,312,320  1.79%  
23. Kentucky 4,126,185  1.71%  
24. Alabama 4,103,235  1.70%  
25. North Dakota 4,090,864 1.70% 
26. Mississippi 4,089,158  1.70%  
27. Oregon 3,691,554  1.53%  
28. New York 3,653,431  1.51%  
29. Arizona 3,065,603  1.27%  
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30. Virginia 2,684,393  1.11%  
31. New Mexico 2,564,863 1.06% 
32. Tennessee 2,561,984  1.06% 
33. Montana 2,238,979  0.93%  
34. Louisiana 2,225,803  0.92%  
35. South Carolina 1,909,099 0.79%  
36. Maryland 1,743,357  0.72%  
37. Utah 1,253,154  0.52%  
38. Wyoming 1,104,702  0.46%  
39. Delaware 933,843  0.39%  
40. New Jersey 866,719  0.36%  
41. Vermont 581,773  0.24%  
42. Maine 553,830  0.23%  
43. Hawaii 549,830  0.23%  
44. Connecticut 526,580 0.22% 
45. Nevada 454,344  0.19%  
46. West Virginia 422,871  0.18%  
47. Massachusetts 413,954  0.17%  
48. New Hampshire 168,871  0.07%  
49. Rhode Island 63,825 0.03%  
50. Alaska 52,987  0.02%  
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH COVER LETTER 
The top 32 top agriculture-producing states received following letter to solicit 
participation in this research.   
 
 
My name is Dr. Matthew Blackwood, and I am the Homeland Security Coordinator with 
the West Virginia Department of Agriculture. I am involved in a Master’s program at the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School. Currently, I 
am conducting research on homeland security programs within state departments of 
agriculture and would like to schedule a telephone interview to discuss homeland security 
initiatives within your agency.  
 
This interview should be conducted with the individual most knowledgeable of homeland 
security programs within your agency. If you are not the individual with the most 
knowledge of these programs, please forward this letter to that person. 
 
Your participation in this research is important to the development of a model homeland 
security program for state departments of agriculture; the larger the number of 
respondents the more valid the model will be. Please be assured that your identity will be 
kept strictly confidential. Subjects will not be identified by name or agency. All data will 
be kept on a password protected computer and will only be accessed by myself. It is 
expected that the interview will last 1 hour.  
 
I will also provide the informed consent form indicating your rights in the research. 
 
I will be contacting your agency in approximately 1 week to ask whether or not you 
would be willing to take part in this research and that you have received this letter. I can 




Matthew J. Blackwood, PhD 
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APPENDIX C: RESEARCH GUIDE 
A. Introduction 
1. How do you view the connection between agriculture and homeland security? 
2. How do you believe agriculture should be involved in homeland security 
programs? 
a. Should agriculture be a member of the homeland security community? 
b. What level of involvement should there be? 
c. What is the connection between agriculture and other agencies related to 
homeland security? 
 
B. Organizational structure 
1. Please describe your homeland security program: 
a. Is it a formal program? By that I mean, does it exist or is it just “other duties 
as assigned”? 
b. Location within your agency:  (executive, stand alone, animal, plant, food) 
c. Staff: _________________________ (numbers, titles) 
d. Primary focus: (animal, plant, food, all hazard, _________________) 
e. IMT/ICS experience: (none, taken ICS training, formal IMT) 
 
2. Do you have an operational budget for homeland security programs? 
 
3. Do you apply for grants through your state homeland security agency?  
a. Have you ever received money for homeland security programs? 
b. How did you use the grants? 
 
4. How do you think that a homeland security program should be structured in an 
agriculture agency? 
a. What would be the optimum way to organize a program? 
b. Should these programs be placed within the agriculture agency or within a 











C. Collaboration  
1. In what types of activities is your agency involved with other governmental 
agencies in your state?   
a. What do you see as the benefits of multi-state initiatives activities? 
b. Do other agencies (in your state) understand the role of agriculture in 
homeland security? 
c. Do you work with the Homeland Security State Administrative Agency? 
How? In what types of activities? 
d. Do you work with your state intelligence fusion center? How? In what types 
of activities? 
e. Do you work with the state office of emergency management? How? In what 
types of activities? Are agriculture issues covered in the state response plan? 
 
 
2. What do you see as the role of collaboration in agriculture and homeland 
security? 
 
3. What are some challenges or obstacles associated with collaboration? 
a. Have you found a way to address those issues? 
b. What are some of the lessons you have learned? 
 
4. Describe your working relationship with federal agencies: 



















D. Success Factors 
1. What are 2 to 3 homeland security initiatives your agency is doing of which you 
are most proud? 
2. What are some best practices you are using? (collaboration, IMT, technology) 
3. What prevents you from doing more of these types of activities? 
 
E. Programmatic needs 
1. What are your jurisdiction’s greatest unmet needs? 
a. Much of the literature and the testimony of some state officials before 
Congress concerns related to animal movement in and out of states. What are 
your thoughts about this issue? 
b. Another concern raised in the literature deals with the lack of interconnection 
between many of the disease testing labs. Specifically, some officials have 
called for a coordinated network of state agriculture testing laboratories. What 
are your thoughts about this issue? 
2. What worries you most about agriculture and homeland security? 
3. What is the greatest homeland security threat to agriculture? 
a. Do you expect an agroterrorist attack on the U.S. in the next 5 years? What? 
b. What are the terrorist organizations with which are you most concerned? 
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APPENDIX D: EVALUATION CHECKLIST 
Homeland Security Program  
Evaluation Checklist for State Departments of Agriculture 
This checklist is for performing final, summative metaevaluations. This evaluation utilizes 
factors based on the Galbraith Star Model. For each of the 44 standards the checklist 
includes 10 checkpoints identified in organizational research. It each standard be scored 
based upon the presence of that checkpoint element.  
 
Then judgments about the adequacy of the subject evaluation in meeting the standard can be 
made as follows: Poor, Fair, Good, Very Good, or Excellent. 
   
Strategy – To meet the requirements for Strategy, the program should: 
 
 Address all hazards within the homeland security program 
 Align with Emergency Support Functions 
 Address relevant aspects of the Target Capabilities Lists 
 Align with agriculture issues in the State Homeland Security Strategy 
 Incorporate agriculture plans into state emergency operations plans 
 Contain agricultural resources in critical infrastructure programs 
 Establish communication lines with state homeland security agencies 
 Develop a long-term homeland security strategy    
 Include representatives in state-level homeland security planning task forces 
 Develop collaborative initiatives with homeland security partners 
 
 9-10 Excellent      7-8 Very Good        5-6 Good             3-4 Fair           0-2 Poor  
Structure – To meet the requirements for Structure, the program should: 
 
 Be located with Executive Division or is stand alone 
 Include an internal planning task force (representations all of all divisions) 
 Focus on entire agency (across agriculture disciplines) 
 Include a homeland security coordinator position  
 Develop initiatives using a risk-based methodology 
 Have organizational (administrative) support 
 Include a formalized coordination for all homeland security programs across the 
state 
 Have sufficient authority to accomplish homeland security program 
 Develop coordination through existing agriculture groups 
 Have adequate resources to accomplish missions 
 
 9-10 Excellent      7-8 Very Good        5-6 Good             3-4 Fair           0-2 Poor
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Lateral Mechanisms – To meet the requirements for Lateral Mechanisms, the 
program should: 
 
 Include participation in multi-state agriculture organization 
 Include a partnership with state intelligence fusion center 
 Include a terrorist analysts position (Terrorism Liaison Officer) 
 Participate in a multi-disciplinary approach to agriculture threats and planning 
 Be involved in public-private partnerships (with primary focus on agriculture 
issues) 
 Establish communication channels with state homeland security agencies 
 Include effective communication and information sharing with other state agencies 
 Include technical interoperability with other homeland security agencies 
 Include an internal multi-disciplinary approach – planning and coordinating focus 
 Develop a critical infrastructure planning approach 
 
 9-10 Excellent      7-8 Very Good        5-6 Good           3-4 Fair             0-2 Poor  
 
Incentives – To meet the requirements for Incentives, the program should: 
 
 Maintain eligibility to receive State Homeland Security Grants 
 Use of SHSGP funds to address all-hazards (support programs beyond agriculture) 
 Participate in regional approach  
 Develop additional mechanisms to develop funding streams 
 Include leadership support and commitment to homeland security programs 
 Reduce competition for resources through collaborative initiatives (with other 
agencies)  
 Develop working relationship with state homeland security agencies 
 Develop partnerships (with counties or state agencies) to attract SHSGP funds  
 
 8 Excellent      6-7 Very Good        4-5 Good          2-3 Fair             0-1 Poor     
 
People – To meet the requirements for People, the program should: 
 
 Include a dedicated homeland security staff 
 Include a terrorism Liaison Officer program has been established 
 Develop an internal program to utilize agency subject matter experts  
 Establish a training and exercise program for homeland security staff 
 Support the involvement of personnel state-level homeland security task forces 
 Define the roles and responsibilities of personnel across homeland security 
community  
 




To determine overall success of the homeland security program, take the individual 
scores from the evaluation and place in the following table. Place the number in each 
category in the summary calculation table. Use the number in each category to develop 
an overall assessment of the homeland security program.  
 
 Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor 
 
Strategy      
Structure      
Lateral Mechanisms      
Incentives      
People      
 
 
Number of Excellent ratings (0-5) ____________ x 5 = ____________   
Number of Very Good (0-5)   ____________ x 4 = ____________   
Number of Good (0-5)   ____________ x 3 = ____________   
Number of Fair (0-5)    ____________ x 2 = ____________   
Number of Poor (0-5)   ____________ x 1 = ____________   
 




Total score: = 21 to 25  Excellent 
Total score: = 17 to 20  Very Good 
Total score: = 13 to 16  Good 
Total score: = 9 to 15  Fair 
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